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HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED  
DATE 04-09-2012 BY 60322 UC/LP/PLJ/JCF

ENCLOSURE

-105-247904-120A

~~SECRET~~

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
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WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

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DECLASSIFICATION  
AUTHORITY DERIVED FROM:  
FBI AUTOMATIC DECLASSIFICATION GUIDE  
EXEMPTION CODE 25X(1)  
DATE 05-03-2012

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10  
JULY 1973 EDITION  
GSA FPMR (41 CFR) 101-11.6

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

# Memorandum

Classification per OGA  
letter dated 4/24/12.

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI (105-247904)

DATE: 6/18/76

FROM : *Bau*  
SAC, SAN FRANCISCO (97-392) (C)

SUBJECT: REPUBLIC OF KOREA INTELLIGENCE  
ACTIVITIES IN THE UNITED STATES  
RA - SOUTH KOREA

~~SECRET~~

Re Bureau airtel, dated 3/30/76, [redacted]

[redacted] Bureau airtel, dated 4/21/76, and [redacted]

Contact with San Francisco sources has failed to develop any information re activities of Korean Central Intelligence Agency (KCIA) acting in any manner which would fall under the purview of the Foreign Agents Registration Act, Title 22, U.S. Code, Section 611-621.

[redacted] regarding Protection of Foreign Officials has brought Bureau Agents in contact with [redacted] believed to be identical to [redacted]

~~SECRET~~

Classified By 7358

Exempt From GDS, Category 2

Date of Declassification: Indefinite

- ② - Bureau (RM)
- 2 - San Francisco
  - (1 - 97-392)
  - (1 - 80-1192)

JWH/crv  
(4)

JUN 25 1976



NOV 15 1976

~~SECRET~~

Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan

~~SECRET~~

JUL 1 1 47 PM '76  
RECEIVED  
INTELLIGENCE DIV.

~~SECRET~~

back of page

~~SECRET~~

SF 97-392  
JWH/crv

b6  
b7C  
b7D

(U) During course [redacted] he has provided information of interest to the Bureau re North Korean matters. This information will be reported in a form suitable for dissemination under appropriate case caption. (S)

(U) San Francisco will remain alert to any activity of KCIA in San Francisco Division, however, this case is being closed until such information is received. [San Francisco will [redacted] and continue to receive information [redacted]

(U) [redacted] (S)

- 2 -

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT  
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

Classification per OGA letter dated 4/24/12

DIRECTOR, FBI (100-25)

6/16/76

SAC, SAN FRANCISCO (100-9893) (C)

*WMD*  
KOREAN ACTIVITIES IN U.S.  
IS - KOREA

Re Bureau routing slip, 4/28/76, [redacted] b1

(S) [redacted]  
[redacted] ~~INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES IN THE UNITED STATES~~  
Sources in the San Francisco Office, who are familiar with the Asian community, have been alerted to be aware of any acts by the Republic of Korean Government [redacted] b1

(S) [redacted] To date, no information has been received by the San Francisco Office which would indicate any action by the Republic of Korea to discredit any Congressman of the U.S.

San Francisco is placing this case in a closed status. However, if any information is received by the San Francisco Office, this case will be reopened and it will be reported in a form suitable for dissemination.

105-247904-

~~NOT RECORDED~~

140 JUN 29 376

~~SECRET~~

Classified by 7356  
Exempt from GDS, Categories 2, 3 & 4  
Date of Declassification Indefinite

- (2) - Bureau (RM)  
1 - San Francisco  
JWH:sac  
(3)

[redacted] b1  
FBI 246053

JUN 12 1976

JUN 11 1976

56 JUN 30 1976

~~SECRET~~

ORIGINAL FILED IN 100-25-47

2/17/87 ..... Sp. Reupner

ENCLOSURE



105-247904-123

# DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION INTERNAL ROUTING/ACTION SLIP

TO	BLDG.	ROOM	NAME/TITLE/ORGANIZATION	TO	BLDG.	ROOM	NAME/TITLE/ORGANIZATION
			DIVISION FRONT OFFICE				SECTION CLERKS
JEH	4026		Mr. Leavitt	JEH	4648		Mr. Anton
JEH	4026		Mr. Helgeson	JEH	4647		Mr. Burrows
JEH	4026		Mr. Cregar	JEH	4648		Mr. Callahan
JEH	4011		Mr. Morris	JEH	4648		Mr. Codd
JEH	4011		Mr. Tansey	JEH	4647		Miss Jones
JEH	4026		Mrs. Liskey	JEH	4644		Miss Messersmith
JEH	4026		Miss Tweedon	JEH	4647		Miss Metts
JEH	4026		Miss McFarland	JEH	4648		Mr. Poore
			SECTION CHIEFS	JEH	6242		Mrs. A. Smith
JEH	4825		Mr. Cassidy	JEH	4648		Mrs. E. Smith
JEH	4092		Mr. Deegan				* * * * *
JEH	4634		Mr. Kolombatovic	JEH	11765		Mrs. Harney
JEH	4042		Mr. Mignosa	JEH	3076		Mr. McHale
JEH	4204		Mr. Peterson	JEH	6658		Correspondence Review Unit
JEH	4123		Mr. Redfield	JEH	5030		Criminal Section
JEH	4439		Mr. Shackelford	JEH	1344		Data Processing Section
			SECTION FRONT OFFICE	JEH	5447A		File Review Unit
JEH	4634		Mr. Flemister	JEH	11255D		Ident Division
JEH	4634		Miss Casto	JEH	15425		Name Check Section
JEH	4634		Mr. Bargmann	JEH	4543A		Name Searching Unit
JEH	4634		Miss Dana	JEH	7230		NCIC Section
			SECTION SUPERVISORS	JEH	6050		Personnel Office
JEH	4644		Mr. Bermingham	JEH	5648		Records (Filing)
JEH	6242		Mr. Brooks	JEH	4336		Records (Mail Processing)
JEH	6242		Mr. Crescioli	JEH	5847		Special Mail Room
JEH	4644		Mr. Duffin	JEH	4027		Steno Pool
JEH	4637		Mr. Feuer	JEH	6247		Teletype Unit
JEH	4637		Mr. Moore				
JEH	4637		Mr. Murphy				
JEH	4644		Mr. Oglesby				
JEH	4637		Mr. Weimar				
JEH	4092						

- |   |                                  |   |
|---|----------------------------------|---|
| <input type="checkbox"/> RECOMMENDATION/COMMENT | <input type="checkbox"/> LOG     | <input type="checkbox"/> NECESSARY ACTION |
| <input type="checkbox"/> SEE REMARKS ON REVERSE | <input type="checkbox"/> FILE    | <input type="checkbox"/> COORDINATE       |
| <input type="checkbox"/> MAKE COPIES (NO. )     | <input type="checkbox"/> SEE ME  | <input type="checkbox"/> PER INQUIRY      |
| <input type="checkbox"/> RETURN (BY )           | <input type="checkbox"/> CALL ME | <input type="checkbox"/> INFORMATION      |

FROM INTELLIGENCE DIVISION - CI-4 SECTION

R. W. Feuer

Rm. 4637 TFR. 7-4, 1984

 BLDG.  
J. EDGAR HOOVER (JEH)  
PHONE

ROOM

DATE

1976

 FORM DOJ-359A  
8-1-74 m

FBI

Date: 6/22/76

Transmit the following in \_\_\_\_\_  
(Type in plaintext or code)Via ST AIRTEL AIR MAIL  
(Precedence)

TO: DIRECTOR, FBI (105-247904)

FROM: SAC, LOS ANGELES (97-383) (P)

SUBJECT: REPUBLIC OF KOREA (ROK)  
INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES  
IN THE UNITED STATES  
RA - SOUTH KOREA

Re Los Angeles airtels and letterhead memorandums (LHM) to the Bureau dated 1/29/76 and 3/15/76.

Transmitted herewith for the Bureau are five copies of an LHM concerning captioned matter. One copy is enclosed for the information of Washington Field.

It would appear all logical investigation has been conducted with respect to the allegations made by [redacted] which were contained in Los Angeles LHM dated 1/29/76. [redacted] of the individuals interviewed supported [redacted]

V-11 REC-114

DE-1

105-247904-124

JUN 26 1976

- 2 - Bureau (Enc. 5) (RM)  
 1 - Washington Field (97-2034) (Enc. 1) (RM)  
 2 - Los Angeles

JEW/nc  
 (5)

53 AUG 1 1976 F-202

Approved: \_\_\_\_\_ Sent \_\_\_\_\_ M Per \_\_\_\_\_

Special Agent in Charge

56 JUL 27 1976 R487

b6  
b7C  
b7D



Airtel

- 1 - Legal Counsel Division  
(Attn: [redacted])  
1 - Mr. R. J. Gallagher  
(Attn: A. E. Meyer)

~~Secret~~

7/30/76

To: SAC, WFO

From: Director, FBI

REC-86

REPUBLIC OF KOREA INTELLIGENCE  
ACTIVITIES IN THE UNITED STATES

RA - SOUTH KOREA

WFOfile: 97-2034

Bufile: 105-247904

RA - SOUTH KOREA

WFOfile: 97-2086

Bufile: 97-5488

Enclosed for WFO are two copies of a self-explanatory letter from the Department dated 7/20/76 together with two copies of newspaper article appearing in the 6/8/76 issue of "The Washington Post" alleging that Representative Don L. Bunker was offered a \$200 watch by Colonel Yas-huen CHOI, South Korean Embassy. [S] (u)

WFO should promptly contact [redacted] Legal Counsel Division, FBIHQ, to arrange appointment for interview with [redacted] in line with the Department's request set forth in enclosed letter [u]


Since the Department has also requested that [redacted] be queried concerning any knowledge of similar activities [redacted] a WFO Agent familiar with the [redacted] investigation should participate in the interview. [S] (u)

Enclosures - 4

Assoc. Dir. \_\_\_\_\_  
Dep. AD Adm. \_\_\_\_\_  
Dep. AD Inv. \_\_\_\_\_  
Asst. Dir.: \_\_\_\_\_  
Adm. Serv. \_\_\_\_\_  
Ext. Affairs \_\_\_\_\_  
Fin. & Pers. \_\_\_\_\_  
Gen. Inv. \_\_\_\_\_  
Ident. \_\_\_\_\_  
Inspection \_\_\_\_\_  
Intell. \_\_\_\_\_  
Laboratory \_\_\_\_\_  
Legal Coun. \_\_\_\_\_  
Plan. & Eval. \_\_\_\_\_  
Rec. Mgnt. \_\_\_\_\_  
Spec. Inv. \_\_\_\_\_  
Training \_\_\_\_\_  
Telephone Rm. \_\_\_\_\_  
Director Sec'y \_\_\_\_\_

RME:ddc dde

(9)



SEE NOTE PAGE 2

2333 Gashhead  
3-8-79

2,3

7-30-96

~~Secret~~

DECLASSIFICATION

AUG 13 1976

MAIL ROOM

TELETYPE UNIT

UNRECORDED COPY FILED IN 97-5488-1

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

# Memorandum

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI (105-247904)

DATE: 8/10/76

FROM : SAC, WFO (97-2034) (P)

~~SECRET~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

SUBJECT: REPUBLIC OF KOREA INTELLIGENCE  
ACTIVITIES IN THE UNITED STATES [S] (u)  
RA-SOUTH KOREA  
(OO:WFO)

b6  
b7C

Re Bureau airtel dated 7/30/76.

Enclosed for the Bureau are six copies of an LHM, dated and captioned as above, reflecting the interview [redacted] (u)

DECLASSIFIED BY *Sp4 [signature]*  
ON 11-19-86

APPROPRIATE AGENCIES  
AND FIELD OFFICES  
ADVISED BY ROUTING  
SLIP (S) OF  
DATE 5/24/99 *gastley*

CLASSIFIED AND  
EXTENDED BY *2333 gaj/pad*  
REASON FOR EXTENSION *3-8-79*  
FCIM, II, 1-2.4.2  
DATE OF REVIEW FOR  
DECLASSIFICATION *8/10/96*

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Classified by #1395  
Exempt from GDS, Category 3  
Date of Declassification Indefinite

REC-74  
ENCLOSURE

105-247904-128

- 3-Bureau (Enc. 6) (RM)  
(1-97-5488)
- 2-WFO  
(1-97-2086)

LEE:cad  
(5)

AUG 11 1976

~~SECRET~~  
DECLASS.

~~SECRET~~



54 OCT 27 1976

Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan

Unrec copy and copy of encl filed in 97-5488



UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Washington, D. C. 20535

August 10, 1976

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

In Reply, Please Refer to  
File No.

~~SECRET~~

REPUBLIC OF KOREA INTELLIGENCE  
ACTIVITIES IN THE UNITED STATES  
REGISTRATION ACT - SOUTH KOREA

[X] (u)

On August 4, 1976, [redacted]

[redacted] was interviewed by Special Agents of the  
Federal Bureau of Investigation. Attached is an FD-302  
reflecting the details of the interview. [u]

b6  
b7C

CLASSIFIED AND  
EXTENDED BY 2333 gaj/rad 3-8-79  
REASON FOR EXTENSION 2,3  
FCIM, II, 1-2.4.2  
DATE OF REVIEW FOR  
DECLASSIFICATION 8-10-96

This document contains neither  
recommendations nor conclusions of  
the FBI. It is the property of  
the FBI and is loaned to your agency;  
it and its contents are not to be  
distributed outside your agency.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Classified by #1395  
Exempt from GDS, Category 3  
Date of Declassification Indefinite

~~SECRET~~

ENCLOSURE



UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

# Memorandum

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI

DATE: 8/26/76

FROM : SAC, WFO (97-2034) (P)

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

SUBJECT: REPUBLIC OF KOREA  
INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES  
IN THE UNITED STATES  
REGISTRATION ACT-SOUTH KOREA  
(OO:WFO)

Enclosed for the Bureau are five copies of an LHM dated and captioned as above. This LHM has, as an attachment, an FD-302 which reflects an interview with

The Bureau may wish to provide this information to the United States Department of State for any action deemed appropriate.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED  
EXCEPT WHERE SHOWN  
OTHERWISE

DECLASSIFIED  
ON 11-20-84

CONFIDENTIAL  
Classified by 1395  
Exempt from GDS, Category 2,3  
Date of Declassification Indefinite

EX-105

REC-89

105-247904-129

22 AUG 30 1976

- ② - Bureau (Enc. 5)  
3 - WFO  
(1-97-2102) (HAHN)

LEE;aih  
(5)

Classified by  
Declassify on: OADR

DECLASS.



NOV 3 1976

Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan



UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Washington, D.C. 20535

August 26, 1976

In Reply, Please Refer to  
File No.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

b6  
b7C  
b7D

REPUBLIC OF KOREA INTELLIGENCE  
ACTIVITIES IN THE UNITED STATES

On [redacted]

[redacted] was interviewed by a  
Special Agent of the Federal Bureau of Investigation.  
Attached hereto is form FD-302 which reflects the details  
of that interview. [redacted] requested that the information  
he provided be maintained in a confidential manner [redacted]

From interview and observation [redacted] is described  
as follows:

Name:  
Sex:  
Nationality:  
Citizenship:  
Height:  
Weight:  
Eyes:  
Hair:



This document contains neither recommendations  
nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property  
of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and  
its contents are not to be distributed outside  
your agency.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Classified by 1395

Exempt from GDS, Category 2,3

Date of Declassification Indefinite

*Sp4 [signature]*

*11-20-84*

*105-247904 - 129*



UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

# Memorandum

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI

DATE: 7/30/76

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

FROM : SAC, WFO (97-2034) (P)

(ATTN: FBI LABORATORY, TRANSLATION UNIT)

SUBJECT: REPUBLIC OF KOREA INTELLIGENCE  
ACTIVITIES IN THE UNITED STATES;  
REGISTRATION ACT - SOUTH KOREA  
(OO:WFO)

b6  
b7C  
b7D

Enclosed herewith for the Bureau, attention FBI Laboratory, Translation Unit, is one xerox copy each of three publications in Korean language. These publications were [redacted]

[redacted] Source advised that there are press releases issued by the Korean Central Intelligence Agency (KCIA) through the ROKE.

## Request of the Bureau

The Translation Unit of the FBI Laboratory Division is requested to translate the enclosed documents and furnish copies of that translation to WFO.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Classified by 1395  
Exempt from GDS, Category 2,3  
Date of Declassification Indefinite

ENCLOSURE

EX 103

REC 32

105-247904-130

2- Bureau (Enc. 3) (RM)  
2- WFO

b7D

23 AUG 3 1976

LEE:stw  
(4)

CONFIDENTIAL

DECLASSIFIED BY SP4 [signature]  
ON 11/27/86

FILE



56 SEP 10 1976

Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan

SAC, Washington Field(97-2034)

August 24, 1976

b7D

REC 32  
Director, FBI

EX 103

105-247904-130  
REPUBLIC OF KOREA INTELLIGENCE  
ACTIVITIES IN THE UNITED STATES;  
REGISTRATION ACT - SOUTH KOREA

OO:WFO

Classified ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ to protect sensitive  
source.

Attached is the translation which you requested  
by letter dated 7/30/76.

The contents thereof, where pertinent, must be  
reported under appropriate captions and afforded whatever  
investigative attention is necessary.

The foreign language material is returned herewith.


Enc. (6)

1 - Mr. Leavitt (Attn: CI-3), sent direct with enclosure

WKK:sdd  
(5)

~~CONFIDENTIAL MATERIAL ATTACHED~~

Assoc. Dir. \_\_\_\_\_  
Dep. AD Adm. \_\_\_\_\_  
Dep. AD Inv. \_\_\_\_\_  
Asst. Dir.:  
Adm. Serv. \_\_\_\_\_  
Ext. Affairs \_\_\_\_\_  
Fin. & Pers. \_\_\_\_\_  
Gen. Inv. \_\_\_\_\_  
Ident. \_\_\_\_\_  
Inspection \_\_\_\_\_  
Intell. \_\_\_\_\_  
Laboratory \_\_\_\_\_  
Legal Coun. \_\_\_\_\_  
Plan. & Eval. \_\_\_\_\_  
Rec. Mgnt. \_\_\_\_\_  
Spec. Inv. \_\_\_\_\_  
Training \_\_\_\_\_  
Telephone Rm. \_\_\_\_\_  
Director Sec'y \_\_\_\_\_



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DATE 11-27-86 BY SPY/CLP/VE

56 SEP 2 1976

MAIL ROOM ☒ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

TRANSLATION FROM KOREAN

"The Domestic and Foreign News Service"

#260

Date: 4/27/76

Publisher: LEE Koo-keun (ph)

Editor-in-Chief: KIM Tae-sup (ph.)

Address: 42-2 Juja-dong  
Chung-ku  
Seoul, Korea

Telephones: 29-8331  
29-8332

\*

\*

\*

Page 1

The North Korean Puppet Regime Built  
"KIM Il-sung Palace"

- In the Neighborhood of Moranbong Hill -

It was revealed on April 27, 1976, from a Japanese businessman who has been to North Korea recently, that the North Korean puppet regime has been building a palace - like residence for KIM Il-sung in order to commemorate KIM Il-sung's 64th birthday.

According to the Japanese businessman, North Korea imported building materials from foreign countries beginning last spring for the construction of the "KIM Il-sung Palace." More than 15,000 people have been mobilized to the house-building construction.

The so-called "KIM Il-sung Palace" has a movie-showing room, a library and a swimming pool. The palace is going to be surrounded by a man-made lake and the palace gate will be connected with a bridge which will be operated by electronic devices.

DECLASSIFIED BY SP4 Eupre  
11-29-86

TRANSLATED BY:

bk  
August 20, 1976.

Classified by 1534  
Exempt from GDS, Category 2 & 3  
Date of Declassification Indefinite.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~



~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Page 2

The North Korean Puppet Regime Reaffirmed Its  
"Victory for the Revolution"

- Commemoration Ceremony of the "People's  
Revolutionary Army" -

On April 25, 1976, the North Korean puppet regime sponsored a lecture meeting on the 44th anniversary of founding of the "Korean People's Revolutionary Army" and pledged themselves to expedite a definite and absolute victory for the revolution.

Radio Pyongyang, on April 25, 1976, reported: "On April 25, 1932, KIM Il-sung declared to the world that the Korean People's Revolutionary Army was founded in the thick of the forest in the Ando area.

"By creating the revolutionary army, the Korean People's Revolutionary Armed Forces were formed. In this way our people's long cherished desire for having our own army was materialized.

"Our duty to unify the fatherland and bring about a lasting victory for the revolution is very important. All party members and workers should protect President KIM Il-sung from severe trials and difficulties and support him politically and spiritually.

We, as his life-guards and death-defying soldiers, should risk our lives for KIM Il-sung in order to accomplish our revolutionary task."

\*

\*

\*

Page 3

The North Korean Puppet Regime Unexpectedly  
Reported a Sporting Event Result

International sporting games or domestic sporting events have never been reported before by North Korea. The North Korean puppet regime unusually reported the result of a sporting event between North Korea and Czechoslovakia.

-2-

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

*Korean*  
which was held on April 22, 1976. According to the North Korean Central Radio Station, the North Korean women's "Yalu River Team" was defeated by a Czechoslovak team in a friendship volleyball match with a three (3) to zero (0) score.

The radio broadcasting station also reported that the North Korean men's "Yalu River Team" defeated the Czechoslovak team in a football game.

In the meantime, North Korea has not reported anything about the North Korean team's drawn match with the Japanese team in the Asian youth-football game which took place in Bangkok, Thailand.

\* \* \*

Page 4

The North Korean Puppet Regime Criticized a Statement Made by the British War Minister

- "The Workers' News" Reported -

Rodong Shinmun, "The Workers' News," organ of the North Korean Workers' Party, dated on April 24, 1976, criticized the statement which was issued by the British War Minister in connection with his recent visit to South Korea. The paper said the following:

"The British War Minister, dancing to the tune of 'The Threat from the North' cried out by the enemy (South Korea), instigated the enemy into preparing for an invasion of the north.

"The British imperialist machination will hinder our unification and aggravate the danger in Korea, which is an intolerable criminal act."

Referring to the British promise to help the South Korean 5-year economy plan for the expansion of military power, the paper charged:

"The British, blindly following the U.S. imperialist war plan, does not want to miss the bus in a war game.

-3-

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

"If and when the British play a role of alliance with the shameful U.S. imperialists who run amok in the invasion scheme of Korea, they will experience a very bad result."

\* \* \*

Page 5-1

→ The North Korean Puppet Regime Criticized the Creation of Cho Min Ryun (the Federation of Korean People in Japan?) -

The North Korean Central Radio Station, on April 24, 1976, referring to the inauguration of Cho Min Ryun, condemned the newly founded organization as a ghost. The broadcast, citing an unnamed news agency, said:

"No one in his right mind will be deceived by South Korea. The South Korean Government authorities are acting out a shameless play in creating a ghost organization in Japan. However, the Korean residents living in Japan and many good Japanese citizenry criticized such a foolish act by the South Korean Government authorities."

\* \* \*

Page 5 and 6

Slander on the South Korea-New Zealand Joint Communique

"The Workers' News" -

"The Workers' News," organ of the North Korean Workers' Party, dated April 26, 1976, criticized the South Korea-New Zealand Joint Communique saying:

"The joint communique is an expression of a laughable South Korean scheme to invade North Korea."

Referring to a statement made in New Zealand by the New Zealand Government, which clearly stated that it would not have any close relations with North Korea, the paper says:

-4-

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

"The statement of the New Zealand Government was made in order to curry favor with the U.S. imperialists. The statement is a haughty provocation to the peace-loving people of the world."

\* \* \*

Page 7

The North Korean Puppet Regime's "Loyalty Play" Is Beyond Our Imagination

Recently North Korea has become desperate in mobilizing people in farming. The following is the gist of the broadcast by the North Korean Central Radio Station on April 24, 1976:

"Our drive to expedite the planting of corns and rice sprouts is to give pleasure to President KIM Il-sung and is a glorious task to report to him. We should observe the following:

- Our bumper crops are the results of President Il-sung's warm love.

- Now is the time to wage a struggle so that we may be able to report our loyalty to President KIM Il-sung.

\* Our drive to expedite the planting of corns and rice sprouts is a valuable struggle to bring to full bloom the self-reliant agricultural method which was initiated by President KIM Il-sung.

- Let us deal an ideological blow to various enemies and obstructors who balk at the implementation of the self-reliant agricultural method initiated by President KIM Il-sung.

- Let us overcome our difficulties with the spiritual power of President KIM Il-sung."

\* \* \*

Page 8

HUH Dam, the North Korean Puppet Regime's Foreign Minister, Negotiated an Economic Pact with the Budapest Government

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

- Met with the First Secretary of the Hungarian Communist Party -

The North Korean puppet regime's Foreign Minister HUH Dam, who has been staying in Budapest, met with the First Secretary of the Hungarian Communist Party on April 24, 1976, and discussed an "economic assistance plan" and other pertinent matters concerned.

(The North Korean Central Radio Station broadcast on April 26, 1976.)

\* \* \*

Page 8

The North Korean Puppet Regime Has Conferred a Decoration Upon the Military Mission of Burundi to North Korea

The North Korean Central Radio Station on April 25, 1976, reported that: "On April 24, 1976, the North Korean puppet regime conferred a decoration upon the visiting Military Mission of Burundi to North Korea." The radio says:

"The Military Mission of Burundi to North Korea has contributed to the promotion of the cooperation between the two (2) armies of North Korea and Burundi."

\* \* \*

Page 9

Common Sense on North Korea

"Self-Protectionist"

The following is the definition of the word "self-protectionist" by a North Korean dictionary on political terminology:

"A self-protectionist lacks boldness and positiveness in his undertakings, thinking only of the safety of his position. He never bothers to correct the shortcomings of his comrades through struggle and he acquiesces to others' faults. It is a sort of individualism and selfishness.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

"A self-protectionist is anxious only to protect his position. On the surface he pretends that he is very enthusiastic about revolutionary works and deceives and flatters his superiors."

Notwithstanding, under the strict control of the North Korean puppet regime, the presence of protectionists is a natural phenomenon. The North Korean puppet regime forces its people to be loyal to KIM Il-sung. The people do not have right to die in the face of implementing the instructions of KIM Il-sung. No creative ideas are allowed in North Korea. It is natural that the North Korea people have become passive and negative in any endeavor.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

"The Domestic and Foreign News Service"  
#273  
Date: 5/27/76

Page 1

Foreign Athletic Champions at the Pyongyang  
Asian Table-Tennis Game Were Under Surveillance

- Exposure by the Sing Tao Jih Pao -

The Sing Tao Jih Pao, published in Hong Kong on May 20, 1976, reported that the table-tennis foreign champions who took part in the 3rd Pyongyang Asian Table-Tennis Game, which was held in the latter part of April 1976, were under strict surveillance by the North Korean puppet regime and were forced to write "letters of appreciation and admiration for KIM Il-sung."

The newspaper further said that the North Korean puppet regime discriminated against noncommunist countries' athletic champions. They were forced to write letters that they were appreciative for the kindness and good accommodations provided them by the North Korean regime agencies during their stay in Pyongyang.

\* \* \*

Page 2

An Undisguised Sinister Plan for the Revolution  
of South Korea

The North Korean Radio Pyongyang, on May 25, 1976, reported that: "Even though the present regime of South Korea (the PARK Chung-hee Government) is over and a new regime has appeared, it does not mean that our struggle is over.

"We should prepare for building a powerful revolutionary force so that we may be able to consolidate and develop further our struggle results and crush the antirevolutionary forces.

"Our resolute struggle for revolution is to wage an all-out fight. We should constantly train the people so that they may be able to wage a violent struggle.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

"Spiritual armament is not enough. We have to have a strong organization. In order to achieve this objective, the labor class should enhance its capacity and make workers and peasants the main force of our revolution."

\* \* \*

Page 3

The North Korean Puppet Regime Fabricates a Case of Provocation on the Armistice Line

The North Korean Central Radio Station, on May 25, 1976, fabricating an incident, said the following:

"South Korea made a serious military provocation by opening fire on a sentry post of North Korea. On the afternoon of May 25, 1976, the South Korean troops bombarded 57 mm recoilless rifle shells on a sentry post of North Korea. If the military provocation continues like this, we will teach South Korea a lesson."

Recently the North Korean regime's fabrication of incidents has increased in number. It is believed that they have a scheme to create an unfavorable international situation for South Korea in the face of a nonalliance conference which will be held in August in Colombo, Sri Lanka, and in the face of the United Nations General Assembly which will convene in the fall of 1976.

\* \* \*

Page 4-1

A Soviet-North Korean Military Leaders Conference

The North Korean Central Radio Station, on May 25, 1976, reported that OH Chin-woo (ph.), the newly appointed Commanding General of the North Korean People's Army (?), met with Aleksandrov Ivanovich (ph.), Air Marshal of the Soviet Union, and discussed the "common interests concerning both North Korea and the Soviet Union."

The radio broadcast, however, did not spell out the detailed story on the meeting.

-9-

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~



~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Page 4-2

The North Korean Puppet Regime Has Been  
Running Wild in the Cult of KIM Il-sung

North Korean Radio Pyongyang, on May 25, 1976, reported the following in praise of KIM Il-sung:

- KIM Il-sung is a genius in revolution.
- He is a hero and the sun of the Korean people.
- Only President KIM Il-sung, who is a genius in revolution, was able to liberate Korea and drive the U.S. imperialist troops out of Korea during the Korean War.
- We, the people, should put our destiny in the hands of President KIM Il-sung.
- It is our duty to be loyal to President KIM Il-sung to the last.

\* \* \*

Page 5-1

Chinese Ambassador to North Korea Has  
Been Transferred

According to a North Korean Central Radio Station broadcast on May 26, 1976, the Chinese ambassador to North Korea has been transferred. The broadcast, however, did not say either the reason why he was transferred or name his successor.

\* \* \*

Page 5-2

The North Korean Puppet Regime Concluded A  
Cultural Exchange Agreement with Romania

According to a North Korean Central Radio Station broadcast on May 24, 1976, North Korea signed a cultural exchange agreement with Romania.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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Page 6-1

The North Korean Puppet Regime Criticized  
the Statement Made by the Japanese Ambassador  
to the United States

A North Korean Pyongyang Radio broadcast on May 26, 1976, reported: "The Japanese ambassador to the U.S. said that the existence of the U.S. Army in South Korea has been playing a role in maintaining an equilibrium in the Korean peninsula. The Japanese ambassador's statement was made in order to protect Japanese interests in South Korea under the shelter of U.S. influence."

Referring to the remarks made by Japanese ambassador TOGO that Japan should continue having the U.S.-Japanese Security Treaty in order to keep an equilibrium in the Western Pacific region, Pyongyang Radio criticized that the remarks were made to assist the U.S. imperialist invasion policy.

\* \* \*

Page 6-2

Egyptian Military Supply Minister  
Decorated by North Korea

According to a Pyongyang Radio Station broadcast on May 25, 1976, North Korea conferred a decoration on May 24, 1976, upon the military supply minister of Egypt. The broadcast says:

"Egypt has contributed to the promotion of the friendship between North Korea and Egypt and supported the North Korean people's struggle for chasing U.S. imperialist troops out of Korea and realizing the unification of the fatherland."

\* \* \*

Page 7

Reaffirming the Support of the Chosen Soren  
(the Federation of Korean Residents in  
Japan)

-11-

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

"The Workers' News," organ of the North Korean Workers' Party, reported on May 25, 1976: "On the occasion of the 21st anniversary of the founding of the Chosen Soren, we pledge ourselves to support, as before, the patriotic activities of the Chosen Soren and to materialize the unification of Korea, which is our foremost task.

"The Chosen Soren, strengthening its solidarity ties with each stratum of the overseas Korean society, should assist, with every means available, the anti-PARK Chung-hee Government struggle.

"Today the domestic and international situation has turned in our favor. Nevertheless, an important and heavy task is waiting for us to discharge.

"The Chosen Soren should consolidate the spiritual cohesiveness of unification of the fatherland and mobilize the people systematically for the patriotic task."

\* \* \*

Page 9

Commonsense on North Korea

"Meeting of Party Representatives"

According to a North Korean dictionary on political terminology, the word "meeting of party representatives" means a meeting which is sponsored by the North Korean party central committee, when a necessity arises.

"The meeting discusses and decides urgent matters on party political strategies. The meeting of party representatives is empowered to summon, dismiss and elect central committee members to fill vacancies."

(Comment)

So far, the meeting of party representatives has been held twice in the past. The first meeting of party representatives was held on March 3, 1958, for four (4) days. This meeting was held in order to fill the vacancies, after a large-scale purge of the Yenan faction and the Soviet faction.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

The second meeting of party representatives was held on October 5, 1966, for eight (8) days and discussed the following matters:

- Three (3) years extension of the 7-year economy plan;
- Coordination policy of economy and national defense and
- Strengthening of the revolution in South Korea.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

"The Domestic and Foreign News Service"

#283

Date: 6/19/76

Page 1

North Korean Puppet Regime Enforces a Strict Control on Foreign Ships Making Calls at North Korean Ports

- A Singapore Seaman Wrote to KBS (the Korean Broadcast Station) -

Mr. Yusuf, A Singapore seaman, sent a letter to the South Korean Broadcast Station and told a story that the North Korean puppet regime did not allow foreign seamen to make sight-seeing landings when they made calls at the North Korean ports.

A so-called "seamen's home" is usually in a corner of the wharf. Only captains can go out of seamen's home under strict surveillance.

The Singapore seaman, mentioning his experiences in stopping at the Haiju Port, North Korea, said, "North Korea was hell; no other place compared with it. When we stopped at Pusan Port, South Korea, there were quite different circumstances.

The North Korean puppet regime forces foreign seamen, who stop at Korean ports, to sign an appeal and resolution paper "demanding the withdrawal of U.S. troops from South Korea and the worship of KIM Il-sung." They treat seamen very roughly when seamen refuse to sign the paper.

\* \* \*

Page 2

North Korean Regime Fabricated a Provocation Incident

North Korea, through "The Workers' News," organ of the North Korean Workers' Party, fabricated an incident,

-14-

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

insisting that during the period April 17, 1976, to May 20, 1976, South Korean troops perpetrated 550 military provocative acts in the vicinity of the main office district of the military armistice commission.

"The Workers' News" further said: "During the period April 25, 1976, to May 19, 1976, the South Korean troops undertook 14 military exercises on the south side of the demilitarization zone.

"If and when South Korea provokes a reckless war, they will suffer a shameful and desolate defeat more devastating than the Korea War."

\*

\*

\*

Page 3

North Korean Puppet Regime Condemned the South Korean Marksmanship Contest

North Korea, through "The Workers' News," dated June 18, 1976, commenting on the marksmanship contest, among government employees, which was held at Taenung, Seoul, Korea, said:

"The marksmanship contest was another criminal act by South Korea trying to put the South Korean people in an invasion of war against North Korea.

"The racket by chieftains of our enemy was an outspoken scheme to provoke a war, inflating the confrontation feeling between the north and south.

"The message delivered by Prime Minister CHOI Kyu-ha at the marksmanship contest was rubbish, with the strong smell of gunpowder."

\*

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\*

Page 4

North Korean Regime Forces Its People to Obey Blindly KIM Il-sang's Instructions

"The Workers' News," organ of the North Korean Workers' Party, dated June 19, 1976, reported: "The first priority of

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

revolution for the revolutionaries is to be loyal to President KIM Il-sung. Hurrahs for President KIM Il-sung are not enough. Even though a man does not say hurrah for President KIM Il-sung, and sacrifice his life for President KIM Il-sung, he is loyal to President KIM Il-sung.

"Loyalty to President KIM Il-sung requires us to possess unconditional conviction and high principles under any circumstances and wherever we go.

"Even though one is to be executed, one should still maintain his principles and retain his strong will power for the noble revolution. He is a revolutionary warrior and really is loyal to President KIM Il-sung.

"Without President KIM Il-sung's guidance, party members and workers cannot materialize our revolution, to say nothing of our living."

\* \* \*

Page 6

General Mobilization of North Korean  
Students for Farming

After successful mobilization of students and teachers of every school level for the planting of rice sprouts, the North Korean puppet regime has been mobilizing students for weeding out the farm fields. According to the Radio Pyongyang on June 16, 1976, practically all school studies have been closed since the latter part of April.

Radio Pyongyang says: "The school administration, experiencing successful results in the planting of rice sprouts, has been undertaking the weeding task in the farm fields. The students and teachers have been doing remarkably well in fertilizing, irrigating and insecticiding."

\* \* \*

Page 6-1

Portuguese Ambassador to North Korea  
Arrived in Pyongyang

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Radio Pyongyang on June 16, 1976, said that Portuguese Ambassador to North Korea, Mario Nebesca (ph.), arrived in Pyongyang on June 15, 1976.

The North Korean puppet regime concluded on April 15, 1975, a friendship agreement with Portugal and sent its ambassador LEE Won-bum (ph.) to Portugal.

\* \* \*

Page 6-2

North Korean Puppet Regime Signed an  
Air Service Agreement with Sri Lanka

The North Korean Radio Pyongyang, on June 17, 1976, reported that the North Korean puppet regime signed an air service agreement with Sri Lanka. Radio Pyongyang said the following:

"The air service agreement will contribute to the promotion of air service between North Korea and Sri Lanka."

Radio Pyongyang also reported that under the cultural exchange plan, a Cuban circus troupe arrived by air on June 16, 1976, in Pyongyang.

\* \* \*

Page 7

Commonsense on North Korea

"Party Cell"

A North Korean dictionary on political terminology explained the word "party cell" as follows:

"A party cell is a key point for party members' lives, it binds the masses, the party and KIM Il-sung. It is also the party's basic organization and a fighting unit which executes party policies.

"A party cell comprises anywhere from five (5) to 15 party members in factories, enterprises, collective farms and on every level of various organizations.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~



~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

"Every cell has one (1) chief secretary and two (2) secretaries. The following are the duties of a party cell:

- Organization of lower levels of the party,
- Implementation of production tasks,
- Inculcation of communism to working people,
- Selection and education of candidates for party members, and
- Surveillance of the movement of the working masses.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

# Memorandum

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI

DATE: 8/24/76  
ATTN: TRANSLATION UNIT

FROM : SAC, WFO (97-2034) (P)

b6  
b7C  
b7D

SUBJECT: REPUBLIC OF KOREA  
INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES  
IN THE UNITED STATES  
(OO:WFO)

Enclosed for the Bureau are copies of [redacted]  
[redacted] written in the Korean language. These [redacted]  
were furnished to WFO by [redacted]

They are addressed to [redacted]

[redacted] advised SA GEORGE SAUNDERS of WFO that he  
feels the Korean Central Intelligence Agency may be involved  
in [redacted]

[redacted] currently resides at [redacted]

[redacted] advised  
he will cooperate in any way possible.

[redacted] are not  
identifiable in WFO indices.

## REQUEST OF BUREAU

It is requested that the enclosed material be  
translated from Korean and returned to WFO.

2-Bureau (Enc. 6) ENCLOSURE  
1-WFO

LEE:dmb  
(3)

EX-109 REC-51

105-247904-132

AUG 25 1976

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED  
DATE 11-6-86 BY [signature]

Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan.

SAC, Washington Field (97-2034)

September 20, 1976

EX-109  
Director, FBI

REC-51

105-247904 132

REPUBLIC OF KOREA  
INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES  
IN THE UNITED STATES

OO:WFO

Attached is the translation which you requested  
by letter dated 8/24/76.

The contents thereof, where pertinent, must be  
reported under appropriate captions and afforded whatever  
investigative attention is necessary.


The foreign language material is returned herewith.

Enc. (8)

1 - Mr. Leavitt (Attn: CI-3), sent direct with enclosure

WKK:sdd  
(4)

*WKK*  
*JFB*



- Assoc. Dir. \_\_\_\_\_
- Dep. AD Adm. \_\_\_\_\_
- Dep. AD Inv. \_\_\_\_\_
- Asst. Dir.:
- Adm. Serv. \_\_\_\_\_
- Ext. Affairs \_\_\_\_\_
- Fin. & Pers. \_\_\_\_\_
- Gen. Inv. \_\_\_\_\_
- Ident. \_\_\_\_\_
- Inspection \_\_\_\_\_
- Intell. \_\_\_\_\_
- Laboratory \_\_\_\_\_
- Legal Coun. \_\_\_\_\_
- Plan. & Eval. \_\_\_\_\_
- Rec. Mgnt. \_\_\_\_\_
- Spec. Inv. \_\_\_\_\_
- Training \_\_\_\_\_
- Telephone Rm. \_\_\_\_\_
- Director's Sec'y \_\_\_\_\_

SEP 29 1976

TELETYPE UNIT ☐

11-6-84 Spymaster

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

# Memorandum

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI (105-247904)

DATE: 10/27/76

FROM : *ADIC*, LOS ANGELES (97-383) (C)

SUBJECT: REPUBLIC OF KOREA  
INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES  
IN THE UNITED STATES  
RA--SOUTH KOREA

b6  
b7C  
b7D

On [redacted] was reinterviewed on  
information he had provided to [redacted] on  
[redacted] This  
occasion was also used to [redacted]

[redacted] He provided no names or additional  
details which he had not made available during previous  
interviews. He had no information on any new incidences  
of harassment or intimidation by the Republic of Korea  
Central Intelligence Agency (ROK CIA) in Los Angeles.

It is felt that all logical investigation of the  
allegations made by [redacted] has been conducted.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED

11-19-86

*Sp. Rep. m. re*

EX-105

REC-86 105-247904-135

22 NOV 1 1976

② Bureau R.M.  
1 - Los Angeles

JEW/jk  
(3)



55 NOV 5 1976

Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan

DECLASSIFICATION AUTHORITY DERIVED FROM:  
FBI AUTOMATIC DECLASSIFICATION GUIDE  
DATE 04-09-2012

FBI

Date: 9/30/76

Transmit the following in \_\_\_\_\_  
(Type in plaintext or code)

Via AIRTEL \_\_\_\_\_  
(Precedence)

Assoc. Dir. \_\_\_\_\_  
Dep. A.D. Adm. \_\_\_\_\_  
Dep. A.D. Inv. \_\_\_\_\_  
Asst. Dir.: \_\_\_\_\_  
Adm. Serv. \_\_\_\_\_  
Ext. Affairs \_\_\_\_\_  
Fin. & Pers. \_\_\_\_\_  
Gen. Inv. \_\_\_\_\_  
Ident. \_\_\_\_\_  
Inspection \_\_\_\_\_  
Intell. MA/CA \_\_\_\_\_  
Laboratory \_\_\_\_\_  
Legal Coun. \_\_\_\_\_  
Plan. & Eval. \_\_\_\_\_  
Rec. Mgmt. \_\_\_\_\_  
Spec. Inv. \_\_\_\_\_  
Training \_\_\_\_\_  
Telephone Rm. \_\_\_\_\_  
Director Sec'y \_\_\_\_\_

TO: DIRECTOR, FBI (105-247904)

FROM: SAC, WFO (97-2034) (P)

REPUBLIC OF KOREA INTELLIGENCE  
ACTIVITIES IN THE UNITED STATES  
RA-SOUTH KOREA

b6  
b7C

Re Bureau letter dated 9/20/76. (U)

Enclosed are five copies of an LHM captioned  
and dated as above. (U)

LHM is classified "~~Confidential~~" in that it  
tends to reflect investigative interest in a foreign  
diplomatic establishment. (C)

The LHM sets forth the interviews of [redacted]  
[redacted] who were  
approached by [redacted] of the Korean Embassy and

These interviews were conducted in connection with the  
investigation captioned [redacted] Et Al; BRIBERY-  
[redacted] and are being provided under this caption for  
information. (U)

EX-105 REC 67

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Classified by #1395  
Exempt from GDS, Category 3  
Date of Declassification Indefinite

11-2  
23 OCT 6 1976

2-Bureau (Enc. 5)  
1-WFO

DWM:cad  
(3)

ICC TO STATE, MAG (REGISTRATION UNIT), 4047  
10/4/76 R.E./PSS

DOC. CLASS. OFFICE

1 Xerox copy handwritten to  
[redacted] by Supp.

Approved: [Signature]  
Special Agent in Charge

Sent \_\_\_\_\_ M Per \_\_\_\_\_

1

Airtel

To: SAC, Los Angeles (97-383)

11/16/76

From: Director, FBI (105-247904)

REPUBLIC OF KOREA INTELLIGENCE  
ACTIVITIES IN THE UNITED STATES  
RA - SOUTH KOREA

Enclosed for Los Angeles is [REDACTED]

Enclosed [REDACTED] indicates that [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] may have information concerning Korean Central Intelligence Agency (KCIA) activity in the Los Angeles area. Unless your files indicate otherwise, [REDACTED] should be interviewed for any specifics they may have concerning KCIA harassment of Korean residents in the Los Angeles area or any other pertinent information relating to KCIA activity.

In the event these interviews develop identities of other individuals who should be interviewed, such interviews should be conducted unless prior FBIHQ authority is required because of sensitive employment etc.

Submit results of investigation in form suitable for dissemination.

Enclosure

RME:ddc ddc  
(4)

NOTE: We have been conducting a continuing investigation into allegations involving KCIA harassment of Koreans residing in the U.S. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] individuals allegedly may have information concerning allegations of KCIA harassment in the Los Angeles area. Above instructions therefore being set forth.

Assoc. Dir. \_\_\_\_\_  
Dep. AD Adm. \_\_\_\_\_  
Dep. AD Inv. \_\_\_\_\_  
Asst. Dir.: \_\_\_\_\_  
Adm. Serv. \_\_\_\_\_  
Ext. Affairs \_\_\_\_\_  
Fin. & Pers. \_\_\_\_\_  
Gen. Inv. \_\_\_\_\_  
Ident. \_\_\_\_\_  
Inspection \_\_\_\_\_  
Intell. \_\_\_\_\_  
Laboratory \_\_\_\_\_  
Legal Coun. \_\_\_\_\_  
Plan. & Eval. \_\_\_\_\_  
Rec. Mgnt. \_\_\_\_\_  
Spec. Inv. \_\_\_\_\_  
Training \_\_\_\_\_  
Telephone Rm. \_\_\_\_\_  
Director Sec'y \_\_\_\_\_

APPROVED: \_\_\_\_\_

Director \_\_\_\_\_  
Assoc. Dir. \_\_\_\_\_  
Dep. AD Adm. \_\_\_\_\_  
Dep. AD Inv. \_\_\_\_\_

Adm. Serv. \_\_\_\_\_  
Ext. Affairs \_\_\_\_\_  
Fin. & Pers. \_\_\_\_\_  
Gen. Inv. \_\_\_\_\_  
Ident. \_\_\_\_\_  
Intell. \_\_\_\_\_

Legal Coun. \_\_\_\_\_  
Plan. & Insp. \_\_\_\_\_  
Rec. Mgt. \_\_\_\_\_  
S. & T. Serv. \_\_\_\_\_  
Spec. Inv. \_\_\_\_\_  
Training \_\_\_\_\_

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED

HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED  
DATE 11-8-86 BY SPY/ELI/ML

56 NOV 19 1976

TELETYPE UNIT ☐



UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE  
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

In Reply, Please Refer to  
File No.

Washington, D. C. 20535  
September 30, 1976

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFICATION AUTHORITY DERIVED FROM:  
FBI AUTOMATIC DECLASSIFICATION GUIDE  
DATE 04-09-2012

REPUBLIC OF KOREA INTELLIGENCE  
ACTIVITIES IN THE UNITED STATES  
REGISTRATION ACT - SOUTH KOREA

b6  
b7C

All information contained herein is classified  
"Secret," unless otherwise noted.

On [redacted] 1975, [redacted]

[redacted] a dinner party [redacted]  
[redacted] which was attended  
by several United States congressmen as well as officials  
from the Korean Embassy. On that occasion, Joseph Addabbo  
(Republican-New York) accepted \$5,000 in cash [redacted]

[redacted] for favors that Addabbo had done on behalf of the  
Republic of Korea. [redacted] is a known member of the Korean  
Central Intelligence Agency (KCIA). ~~(S)~~

(U)

"Washington Post" newspaper articles described  
[redacted] affairs  
arranged by the Korean Embassy to influence United States  
foreign policy. [redacted]

[redacted] at the request of the  
Korean Embassy [redacted] parties were arranged and held  
in the WDC area [redacted] ~~(S)~~

(U)

This document contains neither  
recommendations nor conclusions of  
the FBI. It is the property of  
the FBI and is loaned to your agency;  
it and its contents are not to be  
distributed outside your agency.

~~SECRET~~

Classified by #1395  
Exempt from GDS, categories 2, 3, and 4  
Date of Declassification Indefinite

105-247904-141  
ENCLOSURE



REPUBLIC OF KOREA INTELLIGENCE  
ACTIVITIES IN THE UNITED STATES

~~SECRET~~

The Su Ra Bul Restaurant, located in the Cherry Blossom Hotel in Arlington, Virginia, was the site of at least one party which was similar in nature to the ones [redacted] Several congressmen, including [redacted] and [redacted] and Minister KIM Yung-hwan, the head of the KCIA at the embassy, were in attendance. [redacted] the Su Ra Bul Restaurant is a [redacted] (U)

b6  
b7C

The Gourmet Kingdom Restaurant in Crystal City, Virginia, is another site of such parties which were attended by Korean Embassy officials and United States Congressmen. [redacted] that restaurant at the time of the parties was [redacted] (U)

(WF T-1) (U)

The Korean Government in Seoul became quite concerned about the adverse publicity in the United States which was generated by "Washington Post" articles. Many officials of the KCIA in Seoul wanted embassy officials to discontinue their contacts with United States Congressmen on Capitol Hill as well as contacts with [redacted]. However, it was decided that Capitol liaison should continue but at a reduced effort and at a much lower key. Contact is still maintained regularly [redacted] but embassy officials are attempting to maintain a low profile on Capitol Hill so as not to embarrass their United States congressmen friends. It is not believed that payments are currently being made to United States congressmen. (U)

After United States newspapers disclosed the investigation concerning several United States congressmen, Seoul requested answers from the embassy concerning these questions: (U)

(1) How was Congressman Addabbo paid? (U)

(2) Is it possible to trace the money? (U)

~~SECRET~~



REPUBLIC OF KOREA INTELLIGENCE  
ACTIVITIES IN THE UNITED STATES

~~SECRET~~

b6  
b7C

The embassy replied, either by TELEX or diplomatic pouch that [ ] had requested [ ]

[ ] and subsequently given to Addabbo. The embassy message also stated that the cash should be traceable by serial numbers, however, no safeguards were taken in that respect. Also no precautions were taken at the embassy to conceal the fact that \$5,000 was paid to Congressman Addabbo. [ ] and Minister KIM talked openly about it to other officials of the embassy. (U) (S)

Minister KIM's duties and responsibilities have not diminished because of all the adverse publicity that he has received in United States newspapers. He continues to operate in much the same manner as in the past. He currently, however, is less blatant in his contacts with [ ] and Congressmen on Capitol Hill. He also continues to make many enemies within the WDC area Korean community, because of his intimidation-type procedures and threatening manner. From all indication he will remain in the United States until his approximate three-year tour of duty has ended. (U) (S)

[ ] was abruptly recalled to Seoul, Korea. Whereas his tour of duty in the United States was less than one year, he undoubtedly was recalled because of embarrassment to the Korean Government. He is presently assigned to Seoul's KCIA Headquarters in a civilian capacity. (U) (S)

[ ] had few friends in the embassy while assigned in WDC because of his belligerent and rude manner. He was warned prior to his assignment here to be low-keyed and not to exert too much pressure in carrying out his KCIA activities in the United States, as he had formerly done while assigned to the Korean Embassy in Morocco. (WF T-2) (U) (S)

KCIA members assigned to the Korean Embassy in WDC total approximately seven individuals at the present time. [ ] (U) (S)

~~SECRET~~

REPUBLIC OF KOREA INTELLIGENCE  
ACTIVITIES IN THE UNITED STATES

~~SECRET~~

b6  
b7c

(U) [redacted] no longer is in this country. [redacted] is aware of his status at the embassy and does not hesitate to relate derogatory information concerning other officials to Minister KIM. Because of this, he is not trusted by his colleagues at the embassy. (WF T-3) ~~(S)~~

[redacted] is another member of the KCIA, however, he is not [redacted]. He is [redacted]. [redacted] He resides in [redacted] and reports directly to KCIA member [redacted]. He is high on the KCIA organizational ladder and is believed to have [redacted].

(U) [redacted] which was then given to Minister KIM and subsequently sent to Seoul. ~~(S)~~

(U) [redacted] does not get along well with Minister KIM of the embassy and therefore has limited contact with him. He does, however, have a good relationship with [redacted] and brags of their friendship. (WF T-4) ~~(S)~~

[redacted] is the [redacted] at the Korean Embassy and also handles the [redacted]. [redacted] has personally seen everything that has been sent to Seoul via TELEX as well as those incoming messages. Therefore, he is in a position to be cognizant of all information concerning the relationship of embassy officials with United States congressmen which is related to Seoul and vice versa. ~~(S)~~

(U) [redacted] is approximately [redacted] years of age, [redacted] and resides in [redacted]. He has [redacted] and is extremely desirous of [redacted].

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REPUBLIC OF KOREA INTELLIGENCE  
ACTIVITIES IN THE UNITED STATES

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[redacted] is the [redacted] at the  
Korean Embassy, [redacted]

(U) [redacted] which was subsequently given to Congressman  
Addabbo on September 15, 1975. (X)

(U) [redacted] making funds available  
for his KCIA activities. (WF T-5) (X)

Several individuals formerly assigned to the  
Korean Embassy have refused reassignment and continue to  
reside in the WDC area. [redacted]  
at the embassy, [redacted] was recalled to Seoul  
in [redacted] 1976, but refused reassignment. While serving  
at the embassy, he was involved with [redacted]  
(U) and thus had considerable contact with the [redacted]. (X)

While at the embassy, he disagreed with the  
policies of [redacted] General CHANG Bong-chun, [redacted]  
ordered that [redacted] be transferred back to Seoul. He speaks  
good English and he and his family continue to reside in  
(U) [redacted] (X)

[redacted] is a [redacted] of the  
Korean Embassy, WDC. He too was recalled to Seoul in [redacted]  
1976, because of disagreements with General CHANG Bong-chun  
and like [redacted] elected to remain  
(U) in the United States rather than return to Korea. He and  
[redacted]  
continue to reside in [redacted] He speaks good English,  
but has been [redacted] (X)

[redacted] is a [redacted]  
at the Korean Embassy, and he too was recently recalled to  
Seoul. He also refused the transfer and elected to remain  
in the United States. He continues to reside in [redacted]  
He is a close associate of [redacted]  
(U) (WF T-6) (X)

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REPUBLIC OF KOREA INTELLIGENCE  
ACTIVITIES IN THE UNITED STATES

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(U) [redacted] is influential in the WDC Korean community. Through his position at [redacted] he became acquainted with [redacted] who is [redacted]

(U) He used to make adverse comments concerning the South Korean Government, but never indicated that he desired to be in a policy making position. However, he was appointed to a [redacted] His appointment was evidently enhanced by the fact that he had become close friends with influential businessmen in the United States, including [redacted]

(U) [redacted] visits the United States several times a year and on those occasions he attends lavish parties [redacted] and attended by well known United States congressmen. [redacted] likes "rubbing elbows" with important persons and always brags of his contacts on Capitol Hill. The Korean Government recognizes his influence and occasionally dispatches him to Washington for lobbying purposes. He is close friends with [redacted] and Minister KIM of the Korean Embassy, but his friendship appears to exist because they are both in a position to introduce him to new contacts on Capitol Hill.

(U) When [redacted] visits the United States, he usually brings a [redacted] with him. This money is believed to be used for social activities, however, rather than for payments to United States congressmen for favors. (WF T-7)

(U) [redacted] is [redacted] the KCIA [redacted] an official representative of the Korean Government. He does not receive money from the Korean Government and is not particularly close to President PARK. He is, however, most definitely a [redacted] businessman. He has many contacts on Capitol Hill and uses that influence to keep his rice business prosperous. He is particularly close to [redacted]

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REPUBLIC OF KOREA INTELLIGENCE  
ACTIVITIES IN THE UNITED STATES

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~~SECRET~~

(U) Government officials in Seoul realize he has many influential contacts in the United States and therefore do not attempt to limit his activities, even though they realize that his main concern is himself and not his country and people. (S)

(U) When United States congressmen travel to Seoul, [ ] or Minister KIM will contact [ ] who in turn contacts high ranking government officials in Seoul. [ ] gives them a short biography of each of the members and requests that they receive VIP treatment while there. (S)

(U) [ ] recently [ ] in Seoul and it has proved to be a worthwhile investment. He also owns considerable property and other business interests in Seoul. (S)

(U) He has [ ] but his whereabouts are not known. [ ] at the present time, but supposedly supports [ ] (S)

(U) [ ] (WF T-8) (S)

(U) The Unification Church is a huge business conglomerate in Seoul as well as the United States. Factories and businesses in Seoul which are owned and operated by the Church receive favorable treatment by the Government. They are permitted to use power lines, roads, water, etc., at a reduced rate. (S)

(U) In 1973, as a result of the adverse publicity in the United States concerning the Church [ ] Seoul issued a directive to the embassy in the United States to not get involved with [ ] the Church. (S)

(U) Neither the Church [ ] receives support from the Korean Government in terms of direct monetary payment. [ ] is not affiliated with the KCIA and even though his motives may be questionable, he should not be linked with the Korean Government. He has no close connections with President PARK. (S)

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REPUBLIC OF KOREA INTELLIGENCE  
ACTIVITIES IN THE UNITED STATES

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(U) [redacted] in the Unification Church and the real power behind it. He is the [redacted] and the inspiration for its [redacted] success in the United States. He is a [redacted] at the Korean Embassy in the United States and has resided here for many years. He understands American society, particularly its financial opportunities. He is currently the [redacted]

(U) [redacted] is not affiliated with the KCIA. He does, however, have connections with influential United States residents. (WF T-9) (C)

The Diplomat Bank was established in WDC in 1976 to serve the diplomatic community. Minister KIM of the Korean Embassy was contacted by [redacted] who urged [redacted]

is on the [redacted] and Minister KIM as well as Ambassador HAHM felt intimidated by him. In fact, most of the small nations with embassies in WDC felt intimidated by [redacted] influence, but most of them, including Korea's embassy, [redacted]

(U) [redacted] The Korean Embassy since has transferred the embassy account, the Military Procurement Fund, as well as most of their own personal accounts, to the Diplomat Bank. (C)

(U) Prior to the establishment of the bank, [redacted] sometimes [redacted] concerning Korea. Since the transfer of accounts, no such [redacted] In fact, [redacted] contacted Congressman Frazier on Capitol Hill concerning his subcommittee's activities regarding Korea and requested that Frazier not be so adverse in his thinking about Korea. (C) *DR*

(U) [redacted] of the Board of Directors for the Diplomat Bank. However, [redacted] is the real power behind the bank. [redacted] is the opposition in the National Assembly of the Korean Government in Seoul. (C)

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REPUBLIC OF KOREA INTELLIGENCE  
ACTIVITIES IN THE UNITED STATES

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(U) [redacted] is a close friend of [redacted]  
and is also on the Diplomat Bank's Board of Directors.  
He has no real influence in WDC or Seoul and was probably  
invited by [redacted] to become involved with the bank.  
(WF T-10) ~~(S)~~

(U) The following information concerns Koreans in the  
WDC area who have close relationships with embassy officials,  
including representatives of the KCIA: ~~(S)~~

(U) [redacted] is the [redacted]  
[redacted] in WDC and is a close friend of [redacted] of  
[redacted] He receives money from the  
Korean Government [redacted] and is also a close  
friend of [redacted] are naturally  
favorable toward the Republic of Korea. ~~(S)~~

(U) [redacted] is the [redacted]  
[redacted] and receives approximately [redacted] per month  
from the Korean Government to operate a [redacted]

(U) [redacted] who [redacted]  
[redacted] He has a particularly close association with  
[redacted]

(U) [redacted] is a [redacted]  
[redacted]

(U) [redacted] (WF T-11) ~~(S)~~

(U) The following information concerns Koreans in  
the WDC area who strongly oppose President PARK Chung-hee's  
regime in the Republic of Korea. ~~(S)~~

(U) [redacted] is a [redacted]  
who actively opposes the PARK regime. Most of his associates  
are known to be supporters of the North Korean regime,  
however, it is believed that his goal is simply reunification  
of the two Koreas. ~~(S)~~

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REPUBLIC OF KOREA INTELLIGENCE  
ACTIVITIES IN THE UNITED STATES

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(U) He is not believed to be an active Communist, but rather supports reunification under democratic principles. ~~(S)~~

(U) [redacted] is a [redacted] who resides in [redacted]. He supports the Republic of Korea, however, he is very much opposed to President PARK. He has no known association with the Government of North Korea or its supporters. (WF T-12) ~~(S)~~

(U) The following information concerns United States Congressmen who have in the past supported programs favorable to the Government of the Republic of Korea and who are therefore held in high esteem by officials of the Korean Embassy: ~~(S)~~

[redacted]  
[redacted] He has been a frequent [redacted]  
[redacted] For years he has been sympathetic to the South Korean Government, particularly since he [redacted] He has also had considerable contact with [redacted]  
[redacted] at the embassy ~~(S)~~

(U) [redacted]  
[redacted] but this is not known to be fact. ~~(S)~~  
*Joseph P. Addabbo*  
[redacted] Congressman Joseph P. Addabbo [redacted]

(U) He usually attended parties [redacted] which were also attended by other congressmen and officials of the Korean Embassy. [redacted]  
[redacted] He moved in circles on Capitol Hill with other individuals who were known to be sympathetic with the Government of South Korea. ~~(S)~~



REPUBLIC OF KOREA INTELLIGENCE  
ACTIVITIES IN THE UNITED STATES

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On September 15, 1975, at a party [redacted]

[redacted] accompanied Congressman

Addabbo [redacted]

[redacted] handed Addabbo \$5,000 in cash. (C)

Congressman Edward J. Derwinski

He is a strong anti-communist who is sympathetic to the people and government of South Korea. He has visited Korea in the past and is highly regarded by Korean officials. Korean officials who visit the United States usually make a courtesy call to him at his office and he has attended social affairs at the Korean Embassy. (C)

He is a loyal supporter of South Korea and President PARK's regime. Through his position on Capitol Hill he [redacted] to South Korea. Therefore, he has considerable contact with the Korean Embassy, particularly [redacted] and Minister KIM of the KCIA. In view of his connection with [redacted] he has considerable contact with [redacted]. (C)

He is [redacted] has met several officials of the Korean Embassy. Shortly after his [redacted] where he met President PARK. After his return to the United States, Government officials in Seoul contacted officials of the embassy and requested that the KCIA assist him in his efforts for reelection. It is not believed, however, that such aid was provided. (C)

He is a close friend of several Korean Embassy officials, particularly [redacted] He first became acquainted with KIM [redacted]

[redacted] While visiting in Seoul some time ago, (C)

~~REPUBLIC OF KOREA INTELLIGENCE  
ACTIVITIES IN THE UNITED STATES~~

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[ ] met with President PARK and made a point to tell him what a wonderful job KIM was doing in regard to liaison with Capitol Hill. [ ] mentioned that KIM was highly regarded by all of the Congressmen and Senators with whom he had contact. He also requested that President PARK not change [ ] assignment, but rather permit him to remain assigned to the United States Embassy. [ ] was of course most appreciative of [ ] comments and suggestions on his behalf. (U) (S)

[ ]  
He is a close friend of [ ] who is associated with the KCIA. He and [ ] party together quite frequently and [ ] has stated that he has assisted [ ] in his reelection efforts. (U) (S)

[ ] has made several speeches on the House Floor which were favorable toward the Government of South Korea. He does not visit the embassy, but has had contact with Korean officials on Capitol Hill. (U) (S)

[ ]  
He is known to officials of the embassy as well as to officials in Seoul, because he is a frequent [ ] [ ] He has visited Korea and frequently attends social functions at the embassy, however, there is no adverse information concerning his involvement with South Korea. (WF T-13) (U) (S)

~~SECRET~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT  
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

EXEMPTED FROM AUTOMATIC

DECLASSIFICATION

AUTHORITY DERIVED FROM:

FBI AUTOMATIC DECLASSIFICATION GUIDE

EXEMPTION CODE 25X(1-human)

DATE 05-07-2012

FBI

Date: 9/30/76

Transmit the following in \_\_\_\_\_  
(Type in plaintext or code)Via AIRTEL

(Precedence)

TO: DIRECTOR, FBI (105-247904)

SECRET

FROM: SAC, WFO (97-2034) (P)

REPUBLIC OF KOREA INTELLIGENCE  
ACTIVITIES IN THE UNITED STATES  
RA-SOUTH KOREA

(OO:WFO)

[~~FULL COUNTERINTELLIGENCE INVESTIGATION~~]  
Initiated 7/20/73; Category 2.~~"Secret"~~ All information contained herein is classified  
unless otherwise noted.

Re WFO airtel 9/9/76. (U)

Enclosed for the Bureau are five copies of an  
LHM captioned and dated as above. (U)All information contained in the enclosed LHM  
was provided by [redacted] and furnished to SA [redacted][redacted] on [redacted] [redacted]  
[redacted] Dates of information received and  
credited to [redacted] source have been withheld [redacted](U) Therefore, the Bureau is cautioned to carefully  
consider those facts should dissemination of the enclosed  
LHM be contemplated.

EX-113

DE-31

SECRET REC-5

Classified by #1395  
Exempt from GDS Categories 2, 3, and 4  
Date of Declassification Indefinite

OCT 1 1976

②-Bureau (Enc. 5)

1-WFO

LGA:cad

(3)

Approved: \_\_\_\_\_  
Special Agent in Charge

Sent \_\_\_\_\_

M

Per \_\_\_\_\_

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0-7 TO WFO (CAPTIONED MATTER IS A REGISTRATION ACT INVEST. +  
THEREFORE DOES NOT COME UNDER THE AG GUIDELINES. CORRECT  
YOUR COPY.) 10/7/76 R.E./PSSINDEX  
LHM PPS  
171.12.10

Sh

ICC TO 4047, ICC DESTROYED  
10/5/76 R.E./PSS

A-ED Meyer

FIVE

DECLASS.

Airtel

1 -

11/19/76

b6  
b7C

To: SAC, WFO (97-2034)

From: Director, FBI (105-247904)

REPUBLIC OF KOREA INTELLIGENCE  
ACTIVITIES IN THE UNITED STATES  
RA - SOUTH KOREA

Enclosed for WFO is one copy of a self-explanatory State Department memorandum dated 11/15/76.

In view of the allegation that [redacted] had received a threatening telephone call on [redacted] and his belief that the Government of the Republic of Korea was responsible for such call, WFO should promptly interview [redacted] to determine all specifics he has concerning this matter.

Submit results of interview in form suitable for dissemination.

Enclosure

RME:ddc  
(4)

NOTE:

We have been conducting continuous investigation into allegations of harassment by Korean Central Intelligence Agency officials in the U.S. of Korean residents. State Department has received a complaint from [redacted] that he received a threatening phone call on [redacted] which he believed was done by the Government of the Republic of Korea. To determine specifics, above instructions being set forth.

APPROVED:

Director.....  
Assoc. Dir.....  
Dep. AD Adm.....  
Dep. AD Inv.....

Adm. Serv.....  
Ext. Affairs.....  
Fin. & Pers.....  
Gen. Inv.....  
Ident.....  
Intell.....

Legal Coun.....  
Plan. & Insp.....  
Rec. Mgt.....  
S. & I.....  
Spec. Inv.....  
Training.....

MAILED 14

NOV 18 1976

FBI

NOV 18 1976

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED  
DATE 11-6-86 BY SPY/CLH/CLH

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

56 DEC 09 1976

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION  
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

LA0910 3220346Z

RR HQ

DE LA 037

R 170346Z NOV 76

FM LOS ANGELES (97-383)

TO DIRECTOR (105-247904) ROUTINE

BT

NOV 16 1976

TELETYPE

Assoc. Dir. \_\_\_\_\_  
Dep. AD Adm. \_\_\_\_\_  
Dep. AD Inv. \_\_\_\_\_  
Asst. Dir.:  
Adm. Serv. \_\_\_\_\_  
Ext. Affairs \_\_\_\_\_  
Fin. & Pers. \_\_\_\_\_  
Gen. Inv. \_\_\_\_\_  
Ident. \_\_\_\_\_  
Intell. WLL 11/17  
Legal Coun. \_\_\_\_\_  
Plan. & Insp. \_\_\_\_\_  
Rec. Mgt. \_\_\_\_\_  
S. & T. Serv. \_\_\_\_\_  
Spec. Inv. \_\_\_\_\_  
Training \_\_\_\_\_  
Telephone Rm. \_\_\_\_\_  
Director's Sec'y \_\_\_\_\_

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

REPUBLIC OF KOREA INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES IN THE UNITED  
STATES, RA - SOUTH KOREA.

RE LOS ANGELES TELETYPE TO THE BUREAU AND BUREAU  
AIRTEL TO LOS ANGELES, BOTH DATED NOVEMBER 12, 1976.

PHOTOGRAPHS ENCLOSED WITH REFERENCED AIRTEL WERE  
REVIEWED AND ALL THREE LOS ANGELES AGENTS IDENTIFIED

[REDACTED] AS THE UNKNOWN MALE KOREAN REFERRED

TO IN REFERENCED LOS ANGELES TELETYPE

CLASSIFIED ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ BY 2102, XGDS, CATEGORY 2,

INDEFINITE.

BT

6 DEC 6 1976

# 54 DEC 10 1976

1 - Mr. J. B. Adams  
1 - Mr. J. A. Mintz

EFTO

TELETYPE

IMMEDIATE

FM DIRECTOR (105-247904)

1 - Mr. R. J. Gallagher  
(Attn: [REDACTED])

DECEMBER 3, 1976

TO SAN FRANCISCO

1 - Mr. T. W. Leavitt

1 - [REDACTED]

1 - [REDACTED]

b6  
b7C  
b7D

BT

E F T O

*Republic of Korea Intelligence Activities  
IN THE UNITED STATES*

KOREAN MATTERS; INTERNAL SECURITY - KOREA.

REURTEL DECEMBER 2, 1976, CAPTIONED AS ABOVE.

FBIHQ INDICES CONTAIN NO INFORMATION IDENTIFIABLE WITH

[REDACTED]

FOR INFORMATION OF SAN FRANCISCO, FBIHQ WAS ADVISED  
DECEMBER 3, 1976, BY REPRESENTATIVE OF OFFICE OF SECURITY,  
STATE DEPARTMENT, THAT [REDACTED] IS NOT ACCREDITED WITH STATE  
DEPARTMENT AS A DIPLOMAT. HE ADVISED THAT EVEN THOUGH AN  
INDIVIDUAL BEARING DIPLOMATIC CREDENTIALS TRAVELS IN THE  
UNITED STATES, HE DOES NOT HAVE DIPLOMATIC IMMUNITY UNLESS  
OFFICIALLY ACCREDITED WITH STATE DEPARTMENT.

[REDACTED]

Assoc. Dir.  
Dep. AD Adm.  
Dep. AD Inv.  
Asst. Dir.:  
Adm. Serv.  
Ext. Affairs  
Fin. & Pers.  
Gen. Inv.  
Ident.  
Inspection  
Intell.  
Laboratory  
Legal Coun.  
Plan. & Eval.  
Rec. Mgnt.  
Sec. Inv.  
Training  
Telephone Rm.  
Director Sec'y

RME:ddc ddc  
(8) FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION  
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

REC-7 105-247904-148  
SEE NOTE PAGE 2

TELETYPE UNIT  
RECEIVED  
DEC 3 1976  
64 SP 572

DEC 3 2 01 PM TELETYPE

56 DEC 14 1976 TELETYPE UNIT

PAGE TWO EFTO



KEEP FBIHQ ADVISED OF THE PERTINENT DEVELOPMENTS ON  
TIMELY BASIS.

BT

NOTE:

Referenced teletype advised that a highly sensitive source known to the [redacted] Office reported to that office on [redacted] /76 that [redacted] will travel from Korea to [redacted] in the [redacted] days

[redacted] Source advised that he was told [redacted] had made similar trip [redacted] ago at which time he was [redacted] The source does not know if [redacted] is a Korean official but conjectured he may be [redacted]

[redacted] This undoubtedly in reference to the [redacted] investigation which has been subject of mass media publicity.

On 12/3/76 [redacted] advised SA [redacted] of above information concerning [redacted] We are issuing above instructions to San Francisco Office in the event information furnished by [redacted] source is accurate and determine if it possibly relates to [redacted] This matter has been coordinated with SA [redacted] General Investigative Division, who is handling [redacted] et al. [redacted] investigation. Also, coordinated with Legal Counsel Division. It is noted U. S. Customs advised 12/3/76 that to enter U.S. with a sum in excess of \$5,000 without declaration is a violation of legal Coun. Title 31, U.S.C. 1101, 1102, over which Customs has authority.

APPROVED

Director.....  
Assec. Dir.....  
Dep. AD Adm.....  
Dep. AD Inv.....

Adm. Serv.....  
Ext. Affairs.....  
Fin. & Pers.....  
Gen. Inv.....  
Ident.....  
Intell.....

Plan. & Insp.....  
Rec. Mgt.....  
S. & T. Serv.....  
Spec. Inv.....  
Training.....

*[Handwritten signature]*

EXEMPTED FROM AUTOMATIC  
DECLASSIFICATION  
FD-36 (Rev. 2-14-74) AUTHORITY DERIVED FROM:  
FBI AUTOMATIC DECLASSIFICATION GUIDE  
EXEMPTION CODE 25X(1-human)  
DATE 04-09-2012

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

FBI

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT  
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

Date: 11/18/76

Transmit the following in \_\_\_\_\_  
(Type in plaintext or code)

Via AIRTEL  
(Precedence)

TO: DIRECTOR, FBI (105-247904)

FROM: SAC, WFO (97-2034) (P)

REPUBLIC OF KOREA-~~INTELLIGENCE~~  
ACTIVITIES IN THE UNITED STATES  
RA-SOUTH KOREA  
(OO:WFO)

~~SECRET~~

All information contained herein is classified  
"Secret" unless otherwise noted. (u)

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b7E

Re WFO airtel/LHM captioned as above and dated  
9/30/76. (U)

Enclosed for the Bureau are five copies of an  
LHM captioned and dated as above. ~~DE-45~~ <sup>U-24</sup> <sup>EX-113</sup> <sup>REC 61</sup> <sup>105-247904-150</sup>

All information contained in the enclosed LHM  
was provided by [redacted] and furnished to SA [redacted]  
[redacted] and the  
dates concerning the receipt of information have been  
withheld to additionally protect the asset. (u)

b1

~~SECRET~~

12-7  
NOV 22 1976

Classified by #1395  
Exempt from GDS, Categories 2, 3, and 4  
Date of Declassification Indefinite

2-Bureau (Enc. 5)

5-WFO 1-4058

(1-58-1536)

(1-97-2104)

(1-105-1222)

LGA:cad  
(7)

DEC 9 1976

Records Room

CC in 105-302920

105-290289

DO NOT CLASS

Approved: \_\_\_\_\_  
Special Agent in Charge

Sent \_\_\_\_\_

JAN 10 1977

GPO: 1975 O-590-992

57 JAN 27 ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Unrec copy and copy of encl filed in



~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

WFO 97-2034

~~SECRET~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

The Bureau may wish to disseminate one copy of  
the LHM personally to [REDACTED] Attorney, U.S.  
Department of Justice. (U)

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~~SECRET~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~



UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

In Reply, Please Refer to  
File No.

Washington, D. C. 20535  
November 18, 1976

~~SECRET~~

REPUBLIC OF KOREA INTELLIGENCE  
ACTIVITIES IN THE UNITED STATES  
REGISTRATION ACT - SOUTH KOREA

All information contained herein is classified  
"~~Secret~~" except where otherwise noted.

The Korean Central Intelligence Agency (KCIA) Headquarters in Seoul, Republic of Korea (ROK) has instructed its embassy in Washington, D. C. (WDC) to discontinue all activities in the area which would adversely effect US-Korean relations. In the wake of the current investigation authorized by the United States Department of Justice, Seoul has ordered the KCIA officials in WDC to translate all information contained in US newspapers regarding the investigation and to immediately forward it to Seoul, either by Telex or diplomatic pouch. Additionally, embassy officials were advised not to contact US congressmen or to engage in any activities which would further embarrass the Government of the ROK. (WF T-1) (C)

Several officials at KCIA Headquarters in Seoul have been reprimanded and reassigned to other positions because of their connections with individuals in WDC who may have been involved in illegal activities. Specifically, [redacted] has been dismissed.

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This document contains neither  
recommendations nor conclusions of  
the FBI. It is the property of  
the FBI and is loaned to your agency;  
it and its contents are not to be  
distributed outside your agency.

~~SECRET~~

Classified by #1395  
Exempt from GDS, Categories 2, 3, and 4  
Date of Declassification Indefinite

105-247904-150



REPUBLIC OF KOREA INTELLIGENCE  
ACTIVITIES IN THE UNITED STATES

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VC  
[redacted] who has been closely associated with KCIA officials, both in Seoul and in the US, also appears to be an embarrassment to the ROK Government. [redacted] is a close associate of [redacted] and [redacted] and in view of their current difficulties it is anticipated that he too will be viewed with distain by Seoul officials. He is [redacted]

[redacted]  
[redacted] has assisted those officials on numerous occasions. Sometime ago, he purchased locally various types of

REPUBLIC OF KOREA

[redacted] including a [redacted]

(U)

[redacted] travels to the ROK where he

(U)

(U)

(WF T-3) ~~(S)~~

Minister KIM (supra) continues to head the KCIA compliment at the ROK Embassy. As was previously alluded to, their activities have diminished considerably, however, his position does not appear to have been jeopardized. In fact, he just recently purchased a house [redacted]

[redacted] From all indications, he apparently believes that his assignment here in the US is secure. ~~(S)~~

(U)

~~SECRET~~

REPUBLIC OF KOREA INTELLIGENCE  
ACTIVITIES IN THE UNITED STATES

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(U) KIM receives approximately [ ] per month in salary, plus [ ] monthly in housing allowances and [ ] for expenses involved in his KCIA activities. Additionally, he receives approximately [ ] a month for KCIA activities which is distributed routinely to KCIA officials under his control at the embassy. The latter figure is usually deposited in KIM's account at the Riggs National Bank in WDC. It is not known if that amount has remained constant or if it has been reduced, in view of the reduced activities of the KCIA. (WF T-4) ~~(S)~~

The latest arrivals of KCIA officials at the ROK Embassy are [ ] [ ] who replaced [ ] who was reassigned to the ROK Embassy in [ ] duties include [ ] which were previously handled by [ ] [ ] was recalled to Seoul because of his association with members of Congress, including the alleged payment of \$5,000 to US Representative Joseph P. Addabbo for favors in support of the ROK Government. That money was paid Addabbo in cash on September 15, 1975, at a party [ ]

(U) [ ] The exact transaction relating to how the money was [ ] given to Addabbo is not known, but transpired by one of the following methods: (WF T-5) (WF T-6) ~~(S)~~

The sum of \$5,000 was taken from the diplomatic pouch which arrives regularly at the embassy and presented to Addabbo. Since those funds were not allocated specifically for KCIA activities, the same amount of money was transferred at a later date [ ]

(U) [ ] The matter would have been handled in that fashion in order to keep the bookkeeping straight. ~~(S)~~

~~SECRET~~

REPUBLIC OF KOREA INTELLIGENCE  
ACTIVITIES IN THE UNITED STATES

~~SECRET~~

Another possibility is that \$5,000 could have been withdrawn at a prior date in several small amounts or one larger sum. If a large amount had been withdrawn, then the excess would have been retained in cash at the embassy with the Finance Officer responsible for keeping the books balanced. Also the money could have been withdrawn from the regular account of the embassy and subsequently replaced with cash coming from Seoul in the diplomatic pouch. (U) (S)

b6  
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b7D

[REDACTED]

The primary banking facility for the embassy as well as the officials' individual accounts, has and continues to be the Riggs National Bank. (WF T-3) (WF T-6), (S)

(U) [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] KCIA Headquarters, Seoul, was scheduled to [REDACTED] the ROK Embassy in WDC, as well as ROK establishments in New York, Los Angeles, and Houston during October, 1976, but due to the publicity currently directed toward the ROK, the trip has been postponed. (WF T-7) (S)

(U) Although KCIA officials in WDC have curtailed their activities with regard to operations which could prove detrimental to their relations with the US, they nevertheless continue to be concerned about activities in North Korea. Recently [REDACTED] at the behest of KCIA Headquarters in Seoul, arranged for Minister KIM and [REDACTED] who is now assigned to the ROK Mission [REDACTED] to meet with [REDACTED] at [REDACTED]

(U) [REDACTED] The trip was made because [REDACTED] and several other individuals from the US made a trip to North Korea sometime ago [REDACTED] was debriefed by (S)

~~SECRET~~

REPUBLIC OF KOREA INTELLIGENCE  
ACTIVITIES IN THE UNITED STATES

~~SECRET~~

b6  
b7C  
b7D

Minister KIM and [ ] concerning their findings there. They evidently pressured [ ] to discontinue such jaunts; because [ ] assured them that he would do nothing in the future which could be construed as activities detrimental to the PARK Chung-hee regime. (WF T-8) ~~(S)~~

(U)

During April, 1976, two officials from the North Korean Embassy in Helsinki, Finland, including the [ ] mysteriously disappeared from the embassy. They subsequently turned up in Seoul, where they have been thoroughly debriefed by KCIA officials concerning all aspects of North Korean matters, to which they have knowledge. That matter has been given very little publicity in either Seoul or the US. (WF T-9) ~~(S)~~

(U)

~~SECRET~~

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

# Memorandum

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI (105-247904)

DATE: 12/7/76

FROM : ADIC, LOS ANGELES (97-383) (P)

b6  
b7C  
b7D

SUBJECT: THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA  
INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES  
IN THE UNITED STATES  
REGISTRATION ACT - SOUTH KOREA

18  
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED  
DATE 11-7-86 BY SP4/ELP/RE

Re Bureau airtel to Los Angeles dated 11/16/76.

Enclosed for the Bureau are five (5) copies of  
an LHM containing interviews of [redacted]

[redacted] was difficult to locate and through  
contacting various members of the South Korean community,  
[redacted] finally telephonically contacted the Los Angeles Office.  
He declined to state his residence, his business, or where  
he could be reached. He advised that he did [redacted]

[redacted] to be interviewed and that he did not  
wish to be interviewed and advised the case agent to contact  
[redacted] at Los Angeles telephone [redacted]

[redacted] referred to by [redacted] is believed  
to be [redacted]

[redacted] has been interviewed on  
numerous occasions and although he appears to be cooperative,  
it is questionable as to the veracity of his statements.

[redacted] is knowledgeable concerning [redacted]

[redacted] have previously been interviewed  
by the FBI at Los Angeles. [redacted] advised [redacted]  
is [redacted]

[redacted] in the corrupt South Korean Government prior to the  
President PARK regime. [redacted] described [redacted] as a  
[redacted]

- ② - Bureau (Encls. 5) (RM)  
2 - Los Angeles

EBM/dml

(4)

ENCLOSURE  
EX-109  
REC-45  
EX-109

7 DEC 13 1976

Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan

54 JAN 5 1977

LA 97-383

b6  
b7C  
b7D

No residence or employment are currently available for [ ] however, [ ] is attempting to locate any residence or employment concerning [ ] in the Los Angeles area and will furnish it to the FBI.





UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE  
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

In Reply, Please Refer to  
File No.

Los Angeles, California  
December 7, 1976

THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA  
INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES  
IN THE UNITED STATES

b6  
b7C  
b7D

[REDACTED] were inter-  
viewed concerning any specifics they might have concerning  
Korean Central Intelligence Agency (KCIA) harassment  
of South Korean residents in the Los Angeles area. The  
results of these interviews are as follows:

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED  
DATE 11-2-84 BY SP4/leu/arc

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions  
of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to  
your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed  
outside your agency.



ENCLOSURE

105-247904-150

## FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

b6  
b7C  
b7DDate of transcription 12/1/76

1

On November 27, 1976, [redacted] *Ca*

[redacted] advised that he was aware of the "New York Times" article [redacted] concerning South Korean community affairs. [redacted] stated that [redacted] and that he does not have any personal knowledge of Korean Central Intelligence Agency (KCIA) agents. He advised he suspects [redacted], who lives in the [redacted] Los Angeles area, of allegedly being involved in the KCIA. [redacted] advised [redacted] was involved in some type of plot concerning a political kidnaping in Japan a few years ago.

[redacted] advised that the anti-Korean government faction of the South Korean community in Los Angeles is headed in part by a newspaper, "~~The New Korea~~", 1368 West Jefferson Boulevard, Los Angeles, California. [redacted]

[redacted] advised that it is his belief that the ~~Korean Association of Southern California~~ on Western Avenue, Los Angeles, *Ca* cooperates with the present South Korean government and attempts to stifle local anti-government criticism within the community. [redacted] advised that he has heard

*Ca* [redacted] is supposed to be a "muscle man" for the Korean Association. He stated it is hard to gain specific information concerning activities in the South Korean community [redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted] advised that [redacted] telephone [redacted] described by [redacted] as [redacted] involved in [redacted]

[redacted]

Interviewed on 11/27/76 at [redacted] File # Los Angeles 97-383

by SA [redacted] /dml

Date dictated 12/1/76

2

2  
LA 97-383

b6  
b7C  
b7D

[ ] has heard that there is South Korean government backing for the newspaper "Korean Times." This newspaper, located on Olympic Boulevard in Los Angeles, operates the local South Korean television station in Los Angeles. They have an affiliate television station in Seoul, South Korea.

[ ] advised that there has been some violence in the South Korean community but that little information has been obtained and little or no prosecution is the result due to the fact that no one in the community is willing to discuss these activities and witnesses are virtually uncooperative.

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

b6  
b7C  
b7DDate of transcription 12/1/76

1

On November 29, 1976, [redacted]

[redacted] was interviewed concerning any knowledge he may have concerning Korean Central Intelligence Agency (KCIA) activities and harassment of South Korean residents in the United States. [redacted]

DC [redacted] stated that the KCIA was active in the election campaign for the re-election of the U. S. Senator from California, JOHN TUNNEY, in that the KCIA was behind a campaign fund raising banquet which was to be held by the South Korean Consul at Los Angeles. 300 people were to attend the dinner; however, due to [redacted] KCIA involvement in the fund raising banquet, the TUNNEY re-election committee cancelled the banquet.

[redacted] advised that he received threatening telephone calls following a demonstration at the South Korean Consulate on Wilshire Boulevard in approximately September, 1975.

[redacted] was [redacted] he received a "few" telephone calls stating [redacted]

[redacted] was unable to recognize the voice of the caller but stated it was that of a young male and he believed this person worked for the KCIA.

[redacted] believed that the South Korean government backs the Korean Association of Southern California and in fact furnished half the funds to purchase a new South Korean Association of Southern California building on Western Avenue. The other half of the funds were donations from the community [redacted] is the [redacted] of the South Korean Association of Southern California and [redacted] are [redacted] of the same association. According to [redacted] the KCIA operates through [redacted] and the [redacted]

Interviewed on 11/29/76 at [redacted] Los Angeles 97-383

by SA [redacted] /dml 4 Date dictated 12/1/76

2  
LA 97-383

[redacted] is a "nice guy" but can be influenced. [redacted] advised that this is the reason the KCIA felt that it was better to operate through [redacted] since they knew he could be controlled.

[redacted] advised that since the hearings in Washington D.C., and the rumors about President Elect CARTER, it appears as if the KCIA is backing off in the South Korean community but in reality, according to [redacted] they are organizing in a very different way. They have organized a ~~"Committee to Purify the Korean Community."~~ This organization is [redacted]

[redacted] advised of the ~~South Korean Athletic Association of Southern California~~ *Ca* and its reported control by the KCIA. [redacted] advised that [redacted]

[redacted] Some South Korean senators had just finished making a speech at the restaurant and [redacted] and [redacted] to refute some of the remarks made by the senators [redacted] were asked to leave. [redacted] by the employee of the South Korean Athletic Association of Southern California; however, it was reported that a KCIA agent, name and description unknown, intervened so that there would not be any publicity due to the fact that [redacted]

[redacted] advised [redacted] has knowledge that the South Korean Government has advised the KCIA to withdraw from the United States to some unknown extent.

## FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

b6  
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b7D

12/2/76

Date of transcription

1

On

[redacted] telephone

[redacted] was telephonically

contacted requesting an interview [redacted] concerning any knowledge [redacted] may have regarding Korean Central Intelligence Agency (KCIA) harassment of South Korean residents in the Los Angeles area and his association with [redacted]

[redacted] advised that [redacted]

(ca) [redacted] do not have good feelings toward the present government; however, they are non-political and the organization is strictly social in nature. [redacted] advised that they had one meeting last year and that was a Christmas dance. They have no headquarters and no formal organization per se.

[redacted] advised that he wrote a letter to Congressman [redacted] from Los Angeles concerning [redacted]

[redacted] advised [redacted]

[redacted] had nothing further to add and it was understood that there would be no interview of [redacted]

Interviewed on 12/2/76

of

File # Los Angeles 97-383

by SA [redacted]

/dml

6\*

Date dictated 12/2/76

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION  
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

DEC 04 1976

TELETYPE

Asso. Dir.	_____
Dep. AD Adm.	_____
Dep. AD Inv.	_____
Asst. Dir.:	_____
Adm. Serv.	_____
Ext. Affairs	_____
Fin. & Pers.	_____
Gen. Inv.	_____
Ident.	_____
Intell.	_____
Legal Coun.	_____
Plan. & Insp.	_____
Rec. Mgt.	_____
S. & T. Serv.	_____
Spec. Inv.	_____
Training	_____
Telephone Rm.	_____
Director's Sec'y	_____

SF0590 3392316Z

OO HQ HI LA PD SD SE WF

O 042309Z DEC 76

FM SAN FRANCISCO (105-42352) (P)

TO DIRECTOR (105-247904) IMMEDIATE

HONOLULU IMMEDIATE

LOS ANGELES IMMEDIATE

PORTLAND IMMEDIATE

SAN DIEGO IMMEDIATE

SEATTLE IMMEDIATE

WASHINGTON FIELD IMMEDIATE

BT

E F T O

CHANGED: [REDACTED]

KOREAN MATTERS; IS - KOREA, OO: SF

TITLE MARKED "CHANGED" TO INDICATE SUBJECT'S ADDITIONAL  
ALIAS AS DISCLOSED BY SF SOURCE [REDACTED] TITLE  
PREVIOUSLY CARRIED AS "KOREAN MATTERS, IS - KOREA."

RE SAN FRANCISCO TELETYPE TO DIRECTOR, DECEMBER 2, 1976;

NOT RECORDED

46 DEC 28 1976

DEC 14 1976

54 JAN 26 1977

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED  
DATE 1/29/89 BY [REDACTED]

91808776

ORIGINAL FILED IN

12/13/76

12/13/76 King

5 [REDACTED]

See [REDACTED]  
advised  
12/14/76

PAGE TWO SF 105-42352 EFTO

SAN FRANCISCO TELCALL TO BUREAU, DECEMBER 3, 1976; BUREAU  
TELETYPE TO SAN FRANCISCO, DECEMBER 3, 1976.

FOR INFORMATION RECEIVING OFFICES, A HIGHLY SENSITIVE  
SF SOURCE ADVISED ON DECEMBER 2, 1976 THAT [REDACTED]  
A MAN WHO HOLDS KOREAN PASSPORT, WILL TRAVEL TO [REDACTED]  
FROM KOREA WITHIN THE [REDACTED] DAYS. SUBJECT REPORTEDLY  
TRAVELING ON PAN AMERICAN OR JAPAN AIRLINES. SUBJECT WILL  
[REDACTED] SUBJECT KNOWN  
TO HAVE MADE SIMILAR TRIP FROM KOREA SEVERAL WEEKS AGO WHEN HE  
[REDACTED] SOURCE  
WAS UNABLE TO DETERMINE WHETHER SUBJECT IS KOREAN OFFICIAL,  
BUT CONJECTURED SUBJECT MAY BE [REDACTED] FOR KOREAN GOVERNMENT.  
SUBJECT MIGHT BE [REDACTED]

ON DECEMBER 3, 1976, SOURCE FURTHER ADVISED THAT SUBJECT  
IS [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED] SOURCE ADDED THAT SUBJECT

COULD LEAVE PROBABLY FROM TOKYO AND ENTER U.S. AT ANY PORT OF



PAGE THREE SF 105-2352 EFTO

b6  
b7C  
b7D

ENTRY, ALTHOUGH PROBABLY IN THE WESTERN UNITED STATES.

SF CAUSED RECORDS [REDACTED] SEARCHED FOR ANY ORIENTAL NAME FOR NOVEMBER OF THIS YEAR, AND RESULTS WERE NEGATIVE.

DISCREET CONTACT WITH [REDACTED] DISCLOSED THAT SUBJECT

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] NO FURTHER INFORMATION WAS AVAILABLE PERTAINING TO SUBJECT [REDACTED]

SAN FRANCISCO INS RECORDS CONTAIN NO INFORMATION IDENTIFI-  
ABLE WITH SUBJECT. INS OFFICIAL INDICATED THAT AN I-94 WAS  
PROBABLY FILLED OUT BY SUBJECT ON HIS PREVIOUS ARRIVAL AT  
SAN FRANCISCO, BUT THAT FORM WAS THEN IMMEDIATELY SENT TO INS  
CENTRAL RECORDS IN WASHINGTON, D.C. ON THE SAME DAY OF COMPLETION.

[REDACTED]

PAGE FOUR SF 105-42352 EFTO

[REDACTED]

LOGICAL AIRLINES WITH FLIGHTS FROM TOKYO CONTACTED.  
COMPUTERS DID NOT REGISTER SUBJECT FOR ANY RESERVATION ON ANY  
FLIGHT FROM TOKYO TO [REDACTED] FROM [REDACTED]  
[REDACTED] 1976. AIRLINE OFFICIALS DID INDICATE THAT ALL FLIGHTS OUT  
OF TOKYO TO [REDACTED] PRESENTLY HAVE VACANCIES OF UP TO  
60 PERCENT DUE TO THE LIGHT TRAFFIC. THUS, IT IS HIGHLY  
PROBABLE FOR A PASSENGER TO PURCHASE TICKET MINUTES BEFORE  
BOARDING THE FLIGHT.

BUREAU REQUESTED TO RECONTACT U.S. STATE DEPARTMENT  
REGARDING SUBJECT'S POSSIBLE DIPLOMATIC STATUS, NOTING  
SUBJECT'S ALIASES. BUREAU REQUESTED TO RESEARCH ITS INDICES  
FOR [REDACTED] FOR ANY INFORMATION IDENTIFIABLE WITH  
THE CAPTIONED SUBJECT, AND INDICES SEARCH REQUESTED FOR [REDACTED]

ALL RECIPIENT OFFICES REQUESTED TO SEARCH INDICES FOR  
INFORMATION IDENTIFIABLE WITH CAPTIONED AND [REDACTED]

WASHINGTON FIELD: WILL SEARCH THROUGH INS CENTRAL FOR  
POSSIBLE I-94 FILE FOR SUBJECT TO OBTAIN FURTHER BACKGROUND

PAGE FIVE SF 105-42352 EFTO

INFORMATION PERTAINING TO SUBJECT AND FURNISH SAME TO SAN  
FRANCISCO.

b6  
b7C  
b7E

2. [REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]

BUREAU INSTRUCTS SHOULD U.S. CUSTOMS DETERMINE SUBJECT  
[REDACTED] CONSIDER PROMPT INTER-  
VIEW WITH SUBJECT. IN THE EVENT U.S. CUSTOMS DOES NOT CONDUCT  
SEARCH OF SUBJECT, ASSUMING SUBJECT WOULD [REDACTED]  
[REDACTED] SHOULD BE INITIATED BY FBI OFFICE WHERE  
SUBJECT'S FLIGHT ARRIVED IN EFFORT TO DETERMINE SUBJECT'S  
CONTACTS AND [REDACTED]  
BT

#

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION  
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

DEC 05 1976

TELETYPE

Assoc. Dir.	_____
Dep. AD Adm.	_____
Dep. AD Inv.	_____
Asst. Dir.:	
Adm. Serv.	_____
Ext. Affairs	_____
Fin. & Pers.	_____
Gen. Inv.	_____
Ident.	_____
Intell.	_____
Legal Coun.	_____
Plan. & Insp.	_____
Rec. Mgt.	_____
S. & T. Serv.	_____
Spec. Inv.	_____
Training	_____
Telephone Rm.	_____
Director's Sec'y	_____

FWKYHNO278 3400515

OO HI

DE HN

O 040500Z DEC 76

FM HONOLULU

TO DIRECTOR (105-247904) IMMEDIATE

SAN FRANCISCO (105-42352) IMMEDIATE

BT

b6  
b7C  
b7E

EFTO

[REDACTED]  
KOREAN MATTERS; IS - KOREA, OO: SF

RE SAN FRANCISCO TELETYPE TO DIRECTOR AND HONOLULU, DATED  
DECEMBER 4, 1976. EX-109 REC-87 105-247904-152

INDICES, HONOLULU NEGATIVE RE SUBJECT, HIS ALIASES AND [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED] PENDING CONFIRMATION

23 DEC 14 1976

BT

TELETYPE TO: 69  
54 DEC 16 1976

105-247904-152  
EX-109 REC-87  
12/29/87  
Spencer

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

# Memorandum

TO : The Associate Director

DATE: 12/27/76

FROM : Legal Counsel *[Signature]*

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED  
DATE 11-7-86 BY SP4 Euph...

SUBJECT: SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE (SCI)

Assoc. Dir. \_\_\_\_\_  
Dep. AD Adm. \_\_\_\_\_  
Dep. AD Inv. \_\_\_\_\_  
Asst. Dir.: \_\_\_\_\_  
Adm. Serv. \_\_\_\_\_  
Ext. Affairs \_\_\_\_\_  
Fin. & Pers. \_\_\_\_\_  
Gen. Inv. \_\_\_\_\_  
Ident. \_\_\_\_\_  
Inspection \_\_\_\_\_  
Intell. \_\_\_\_\_  
Laboratory \_\_\_\_\_  
Legal Coun. \_\_\_\_\_  
Plan. & Eval. \_\_\_\_\_  
Rec. Mgnt. \_\_\_\_\_  
Spec. Inv. \_\_\_\_\_  
Training \_\_\_\_\_  
Telephone Rm. \_\_\_\_\_  
Director's Sec'y \_\_\_\_\_

## PURPOSE:

To advise of request from SCI dated 12/17/76.

## DETAILS:

*detached & handled separately*

Attached request dated 12/17/76 from the SCI addressed to the Attorney General requests certain information concerning the Bureau's knowledge of the activities of the Korean Central Intelligence Agency during the period of 1970-74 and the general rules, procedures and policies pertaining to FBI investigations of non-criterion countries' foreign intelligence services.

The request was furnished to the Bureau by Assistant Attorney General                      Office of Legislative Affairs, by routing slip dated 12/23/76.                      requested a response be prepared for the Attorney General's signature and that other Justice Department components be advised of the nature of the FBI's response.

## RECOMMENDATION:

*detached & handled separately*

That the Intelligence Division with input, if necessary, from the General Investigative Division prepare an appropriate response to the SCI's request. The response should be in the form of a letterhead memorandum transmitted by cover memorandum to the Attorney General and to be hand-delivered to the Department by the Office of Congressional Affairs, Legal Counsel Division.

Enclosure

62-117121

- 1 - Mr. Gallagher - Enc.
- 1 - Mr. Leavitt - Enc.
- 1 - Mr. Mintz - Enc.
- 2 -                      - Enc.

APPROVED:

Director                       
Assoc. Dir.                       
Dep. AD Adm.                       
Dep. AD Inv.                     

Adm. Serv.                       
Ext. Affairs                       
Fin. & Pers.                       
Gen. Inv.                       
Ident.                       
Intell.                     

Legal Coun.                       
Plan. & Insp.                       
Rec. Mgnt.                       
S. & T. Serv.                       
Spec. Inv.                       
Training                     

PVD:lad                     

84 MAR 1977

Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan

FBI/DOJ

ORIGINAL FILED IN 62-117121-96

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

# Memorandum

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI

FROM : SAC, SAN FRANCISCO (105-42441)(C)

DATE: 12/22/76

b6  
b7C  
b7D  
b7E

SUBJECT:

INFORMATION CONCERNING

*Republic of Korea Intelligence Activities  
in the United States*

For information of the Bureau, captioned individual had made a complaint to the San Francisco Office of the FBI [redacted] 1976, stating that he was [redacted]

He stated he had demonstrated against the PAK regime in South Korea and had had confrontations with [redacted] whom he stated was a [redacted]

It is further to be noted for information of the Bureau, [redacted] was interviewed by an Agent of the FBI on [redacted] stated in this interview he had had an argument with [redacted] [redacted] advised he confronted [redacted] at that time and told him to mind his own business as [redacted] and handling of Korean affairs was his business. [redacted] stated as in a previous interview that had been conducted over a year before with the FBI, that he is not a Korean CIA agent and is [redacted] he further stated that the allegations made by [redacted] were totally untrue.

It is to be noted on [redacted] /76, [redacted] pretext [redacted] the South Korean Consulate in San Francisco and it was determined by [redacted] that, no one was there with the name of [redacted]

For further information of the Bureau, by letter dated 12/15/76, Chief DAVID A. HANSEN, Daly City Police Department, communicated to the San Francisco FBI Office further complaints by [redacted] regarding alleged threats [redacted]

- (2) - Bureau (RM)
- 1 - San Francisco

RCF/sip  
(3)

57 FEB 2 1977

Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan

21 DEC 28 1976

SF 105-42441  
RCF/sjp

and several others had discussed [redacted]

This individual, [redacted] advised that this conversation had taken place around [redacted] just prior to the election of the new President of the Korean Association in San Francisco.

This information and a [redacted]

[redacted] forwarded it to the San Francisco FBI Office inasmuch as he felt there might possibly be some international significance to it, and also possibly some violation of Federal law.

Review of the information available to San Francisco by SA [redacted] was conducted and on 12/21/76 he presented the facts in this case to AUSA [redacted] of the Northern District of California, and he advised that his opinion was that there was insufficient information available to indicate a violation of Federal law. It is to be noted this opinion was confirmed in writing by SA [redacted] and a communication is being sent to Chief of Police HANSEN of the Daly City PD stating AUSA [redacted] opinion, and indicating that it would appear now that [redacted] situation is a local police matter as the FBI has been found not to have jurisdiction.

It is further to be noted that recent issues of the "New York Times" daily newspaper has indicated South Korean CIA people are all being withdrawn from the United States.

1 - [redacted]

SAC, San Francisco (97-392)

1/21/77

Director, FBI (105-247904)

b6  
b7C  
b7D

REPUBLIC OF KOREA INTELLIGENCE  
ACTIVITIES IN THE UNITED STATES  
RA - SOUTH KOREA

Reurlet 12/22/76 captioned [redacted]  
Information Concerning."


A review of FBIHQ files indicate [redacted]  
[redacted] identified in referenced letter, appears identical  
with [redacted] subject of your file [redacted]

Since referenced letter indicates [redacted] has  
apparently alleged harassment by the Korean Central  
Intelligence Agency (KCIA) and noting the widespread  
investigation the FBI has conducted into these allega-  
tions, you should promptly set forth in LHM form the  
pertinent results of your investigation following  
receipt of complaint by [redacted] 1976. Additionally,  
if not done previously, you should attempt to locate and  
interview the individual identified in referenced letter as  
[redacted] allegedly has information concerning  
[redacted]

While it is not clear what facts were presented  
to the Assistant United States Attorney (AUSA) in the  
Northern District of California in this matter, it should  
be noted that an individual acting at the direction of KCIA  
could be in violation of the Foreign Agents Registration  
Act and a decision in this regard must be presented to the  
Department of Justice for their consideration.

Assoc. Dir. \_\_\_\_\_ RME:ddcddc  
Dep. AD Adm. \_\_\_\_\_ (4)  
Dep. AD Inv. \_\_\_\_\_

Asst. Dir.:  
Adm. Serv. \_\_\_\_\_  
Ext. Affairs \_\_\_\_\_  
Fin. & Pers. \_\_\_\_\_  
Gen. Inv. \_\_\_\_\_  
Ident. \_\_\_\_\_  
Inspection \_\_\_\_\_  
Intell. \_\_\_\_\_  
Laboratory \_\_\_\_\_  
Legal Coun. \_\_\_\_\_  
Plan. & Eval. \_\_\_\_\_  
Rec. Mgnt. \_\_\_\_\_  
Spec. Inv. \_\_\_\_\_  
Training \_\_\_\_\_  
Telephone Rm. \_\_\_\_\_  
Director Sec'y \_\_\_\_\_



EX-109

REC-2

20 JAN 21 1977  
SEE NOTE PAGE 2

TELETYPE UNIT ☐



Letter to San Francisco  
Re: Republic of Korea Intelligence  
Activities in the United States  
105-247904

b6  
b7C  
b7D

\*NOTE:

By referenced letter, San Francisco advised it had received a complaint from a [redacted] resident named [redacted] concerning harassment of him by [redacted] who he identified as [redacted]. San Francisco determined that he was not a consular official.

FBIHQ indices indicate [redacted] most likely is identical with an individual that office has previously interviewed following allegation [redacted] was affiliated with the KCIA.

Referenced letter also indicates that in [redacted] 1976, [redacted] had furnished to a local chief of police in San Francisco information indicating that an individual by the name of [redacted] had pertinent data concerning a threat [redacted]

San Francisco indicated facts in this matter had been presented to the AUSA, San Francisco, who declined prosecution.

Above instructions being set forth for San Francisco in view of our widespread investigation into allegations of KCIA harassment of Korean residents in the U.S.

APPROVED:

Director.....  
Assoc. Dir.....  
Dep. AD Adm.....  
Dep. AD Inv.....

Adm. Serv.....  
Ext. Affairs.....  
Fin. & Pers.....  
Gen. Inv.....  
Ident.....  
Intell. [signature]

Legal Coun.....  
Plan. & Insp.....  
Rec. Mgmt.....  
Spec. Inv.....  
Tech. Serv.....

FBI

## TRANSMIT VIA:

☐ Teletype  
☐ Facsimile  
☒ Airtel

## PRECEDENCE:

☐ Immediate  
☐ Priority  
☐ Routine

## CLASSIFICATION:

☐ TOP SECRET  
☐ SECRET  
☐ CONFIDENTIAL  
☐ E F T O  
☐ CLEAR

Date 1/18/77

TO: DIRECTOR, FBI (105-247904)

FROM: SAC, SAN FRANCISCO (105-42352) (C)

SUBJECT: 

IS-KOREA  
 OO: SAN FRANCISCO

b6  
 b7C  
 b7D

San Francisco teletype to Bureau, dated 12/4/76;  
 Bureau teletype to San Francisco, dated 12/13/76; WFO airtel  
 to Bureau, dated 1/11/77.

Contacts with   
 to date have developed no additional infor-  
 mation pertaining to the Subject's movement.

On 12/29/76 

inquired as to  
 whether additional information pertaining to the Subject had  
 been developed, and subsequent contact with San Francisco  
 asset had failed to disclose any additional information per-  
 taining to Subject's identity or movement.  indicated  
 that

Indices search from the Bureau and concerned offices  
 were negative pertaining to the Subject. WFO, INS Central  
 indices search indicated no record pertaining to the Subject.

② - Bureau (RM)

1 - San Francisco

AJP/las

(3)

REC-33

105-247904-159

X-109

17 JAN 21 1977

Approved: 1 1977

Transmitted

(Number)

(Time)

FIVE

SF 105-42352  
AJP/las

In view of the fact that all leads pertaining to the Subject were met with negative results and no additional information has been developed pertaining to the Subject and his movement, this case is to be placed in a closed status.

1 - Mr. J. B. Adams  
1 - Mr. J. A. Mintz  
(Attn: [redacted])  
1 - Mr. T. W. Leavitt

b6  
b7C

Assistant Attorney General  
Office of Legislative Affairs  
Director, FBI

January 18, 1977

1 - [redacted]  
1 - [redacted]

UNITED STATES SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE  
ON INTELLIGENCE

Enclosed for your approval and forwarding is an original letterhead memorandum and enclosures responsive to the request of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, in its letter of December 17, 1976, to the Attorney General. Also enclosed are two copies of the letterhead memorandum and its enclosures for your information and for the information of the Assistant Attorney General, Criminal Division (Public Integrity Section).

Enclosures - 16

105-247904

RME:emw *emw*  
(8)

APPROVED:

Director *[initials]*  
Assoc. Dir. *[initials]*  
Dep. AD Adm. *[initials]*  
Dep. AD Inv. *[initials]*

Adm. Serv. *[initials]*  
Ext. Affairs *[initials]*  
Fin. & Pers. *[initials]*  
Gen. Inv. *[initials]*  
Ident. *[initials]*  
Intell. *[initials]*

Legal Coun. *[initials]*  
Plan. & Insp. *[initials]*  
Rec. Mgt. *[initials]*  
S. & T. Serv. *[initials]*  
Spec. Inv. *[initials]*  
Training *[initials]*

NOTE:

By letter to the Attorney General, 12/17/76, and forwarded to FBIHQ by the AAG, Office of Legislative Affairs, the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence (SCI) requested information concerning our possible knowledge of the activities of the Korean Central Intelligence Agency (KCIA) during the period of 1970-74, as well as the general rules, procedures and policies pertaining to FBI investigations of the non-criteria countries' foreign intelligence services.

NOT RECORDED

7 FEB 17 1977

Enclosed memoranda contain results of our investigation during 1970-74 into allegations that KCIA was involved in harassment of Korean residents in the U. S. The original memorandum enclosed responds to questions asked by the SCI. This matter coordinated with SA [redacted] and SA [redacted] Office of Congressional Affairs, Legal Counsel Division. Regarding SCI's request to be furnished copies of material relating to KCIA activity during the pertinent period, which was furnished by other agencies, SA [redacted] after consultation with the Office of Legislative Affairs at the Department was advised that SCI should address this request to the originating agencies. Concerning our policy of investigations re friendly countries, data set forth on page 2 of enclosed LHM was taken from re-  
coverable internal Bureau documents.

SECRET MATERIAL ATTACHED

Telephone Rm. *[initials]*  
Director's Sec'y *[initials]* MAIL ROOM *[initials]* TELETYPE UNIT *[initials]*

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

*Memorandum*

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI (105-247904)

DATE: 2/2/77

b6  
b7C  
b7D

FROM: SAC, WFO (97-2034)

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~SUBJECT: REPUBLIC OF KOREA INTELLIGENCE  
ACTIVITIES IN THE UNITED STATES  
RA-SOUTH KOREADECLASSIFIED BY *SPH/Elm/re*  
ON *11-20-20*Re Bureau airtel dated 11/19/76, with U.S.  
Department of State (USDS) memorandum dated 11/15/76.  
(U)~~Confidential~~ All information contained herein is classified  
"Confidential" unless otherwise noted.A Review of WFO files disclosed that  
is identical with [ ] the subject of [ ]  
[ ] (U) [ ]~~CONFIDENTIAL~~Classified by #1395 DE-39  
Exempt from GDS, Categories 2 and 3  
Date of Declassification Indefinite

22 FEB 3 1977

②-Bureau  
1-WFOLGA:cad  
(3)ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED  
DATE \_\_\_\_\_ BY \_\_\_\_\_*FILE*

54 FEB 14 1977

Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan

WFO 97-2034

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

b6  
b7C  
b7D

[ ] In view of [ ]  
[ ] it appears that he feels threatened by officials  
of the ROK Embassy and its supporters. However, it also  
appears that his [ ]

Therefore, in view of the above, WFO believes  
that it would be neither advantageous or appropriate to  
interview him at this time, UACB. (U)

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

EXEMPTED FROM AUTOMATIC  
DECLASSIFICATION  
AUTHORITY DERIVED FROM:  
FBI AUTOMATIC DECLASSIFICATION GUIDE  
EXEMPTION CODE 25X(1-human)  
DATE 05-07-2012

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~  
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION  
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT  
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

FEB 10 1977

TELETYPE

NY0205 0412237

RR HQ NK

DE NY

R 102217Z FEB 77FM NEW YORK (105-130017)

TO DIRECTOR (105-247904) ROUTINE

NEWARK [REDACTED] ROUTINE b1

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

REPUBLIC OF KOREA INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES IN THE UNITED

STATES-REGISTRATION ACT SOUTH KOREA

REBUTEL, DATED FEBRUARY 9, 1977.

(C) RETEL FURNISHED INFORMATION CONCERNING ANTI-PAK ACTIVITIES  
IN THE NYC AREA. IT IS NOTED THAT NEWARK SOURCE [REDACTED] b1

AND,

THEREFORE, IT IS FELT THAT THE NEWARK DIVISION SHOULD HAVE A  
COPY OF RETEL. DUE TO ITS CLASSIFICATION, THE NYO IS SENDING A  
COPY OF THIS TELETYPE TO NEWARK BY COURIER. (C)

(U) CLASSIFIED BY ~~107~~, XGDS ~~2~~ AND 3, INDEFINITE.

BT.

#

70 FEB 22 1977

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

La.  
Plan.  
Rec.  
S. & T. Sec.  
Spec. Inv.  
Tr. & S.  
Telephone Rm.  
Director's Sec'y

*McGowan*

22 FEB 15 1977

*5 Pigeon*

*11-7-86*  
*Signature*  
*216053*

*105-247904-1164*